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A MORE INCLUSIVE DEMOCRACY:




New York excludes all individuals who have ever been
convicted of a felony from its jury pool except in the most ex-
traordinary circumstances.1 This practice undermines the repre-
sentativeness of juries, their inclusiveness, as well as public
confidence in the courts. It leaves whole communities under-
represented in one of the foundations of democracy. It also com-
promises an individual’s constitutional rights. People with felony-
conviction histories are included in the jury pools of nearly half of
United States jurisdictions, yet the effectiveness of judicial systems
in those jurisdictions has not been compromised. The mechanisms
for insuring that juries are competent and unbiased—voir dire, per-
emptory challenges and challenges for cause—all work in those ju-
risdictions without alienating a segment of the population from the
mechanisms of civic participation. The citizens of New York de-
serve no less.
Copyright  2011 by Paula Z. Segal.
† J.D. Candidate, 2011, Haywood Burns Fellow in Civil and Human Rights, Belle
Zeller Scholar, City University of New York School of Law. Thank you to Juan Carta-
gena at Community Service Society of New York for asking the question and to Profes-
sor Ruthann Robson for her guidance in developing the answer into this Note. Thank
you also to family and friends who have cheered me on through the writing process.
1 See infra note 3.
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INTRODUCTION
Thomas Jefferson called the jury the “school by which the peo-
ple learn the exercise of civic duties as well as rights.”2 Yet many
citizens are permanently expelled from the jury system. Felon jury
exclusion disqualifies anyone with a history of felony conviction
from the jury pool in New York State.3 Anyone who has ever taken
a guilty plea to a charge that he or she was in possession of eight
ounces of marihuana, rather than stand trial, will never be in-
cluded in the jury pool.4 Neither will anyone ever convicted of
scalping tickets to a sporting event where there was a premium of
$1000 or more over the price of the tickets;5 nor anyone who was
once convicted of a crime that was at the time a felony but is not
one today for reasons of having been reduced to a misdemeanor or
declared unconstitutional.6 New York law disqualifies anyone who
was at any time in his or her life convicted of a crime for which the
court could have chosen a sentence of a year or more incarceration
from jury service for life.7
Citizens who have conviction histories do not adversely affect
the judicial process by being included in the jury pool. The prevail-
ing argument in favor of felon jury exclusion is simply a deference
to stereotyped notions about jury purity, divorced from the realities
of jury selection.8 The law’s conflation of a felony-conviction his-
2 LINDA KERBER, NO CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE LADIES 129 (1998).
3 People v. Adams, 747 N.Y.S.2d 909, 915 (Sup. Ct. Kings Cnty. 2002). There is a
very narrow exception: the issuance of a Certificate of Relief from Disabilities
(“CRD”), see N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 701 (McKinney 2003 & Supp. 2010), or a Certifi-
cate of Good Conduct (“CGC”), see N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 703-a (McKinney 2003 &
Supp. 2010), relieves a convicted person of the automatic bar from serving on a jury.
See 1991 N.Y. Op. Att’y Gen. 38, 42–44 (1991). However, the determination whether a
person is then eligible for jury service is at the discretion of the Commissioner of
Jurors. Id. Even when a person convicted of a felony does receive a CRD or a CGC, it
does not actually restore the right to serve on the jury. Adams, 747 N.Y.S.2d at 915.
The author spoke to a representative of the Commissioner who said that, although
there is no available data for the number of people who become re-qualified to serve
on a jury by getting either Certificate, the number is “very small.” Telephone Inter-
view with Elissa Krauss, Research Coordinator, Unified Court System’s Office of Court
Research-Jury Trial Project (Nov. 12, 2009).
4 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 221.20 (McKinney 2008).
5 See infra note 27 and accompanying text.
6 Telephone Interview with Elissa Krauss, supra note 3.
7 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00(5) (McKinney 2009). Similarly, federal law states that
an individual who “has a charge pending against him for the commission of, or has
been convicted in a State or Federal court of record of, a crime punishable by impris-
onment for more than one year and his civil rights have not been restored” shall not
be deemed qualified to serve on grand and petit juries in the district court. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1865(b)(5) (2006).
8 See infra Part III.A.3.
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tory with a bias that would affect jury deliberations has resulted in
the abrogation of citizens’ rights to participate in a key democratic
institution. Simultaneously, it is a threat to civil litigants’ and crimi-
nal defendants’ rights to impartial juries drawn from their
communities.
The exclusion particularly bars participation by members of
those communities whose ties to the democratic process are al-
ready weak. Through the racial disparities in the criminal justice
system, a disproportionate number of minority citizens are ex-
cluded from the jury pool.9 Researchers estimate that 33% of Afri-
can American males have felony-conviction histories.10
Felon jury exclusion is at cross-purposes with the inclusive
goals of the American jury system. To make up for a shortage of
jurors, New York courts have reformed the jury recruitment pro-
cess at great cost.11 However, New York continues to ban a large
swath of citizens from inclusion in the pool due to felon jury exclu-
sion.12 Eliminating the blanket exclusion would expand the jury
pool, make juries more inclusive and representative, and help inte-
grate citizens who have completed their criminal sentences into
democratic society.
Permanent felon exclusion is vulnerable to a challenge
through litigation: it is likely a violation of the fair-cross-section re-
quirement imposed on all criminal and civil juries by New York law
and the U.S. Constitution, as well as the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.13
This Note presents a history of New York’s felon jury exclu-
sion, discusses the effects it is having on present-day juries and
communities, and describes the constitutional deficiencies of the
practice. Part One describes the effects of the exclusion in New
York and presents some alternatives to New York’s policy. Part Two
presents the legislative history of the exclusion and efforts to re-
9 See infra notes 37–42 and accompanying text.
10 Christopher Uggen, Jeff Manza & Melissa Thompson, Citizenship, Democracy, and
the Civic Reintegration of Criminal Offenders, 605 ANNALS OF AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI.
281, 290 tbl.2 (2006).
11 See infra notes 102–13 and accompanying text.
12 See N.Y. JUD. LAW § 510(3) (McKinney 2003).
13 The Fair Cross-Section requirement is imposed on criminal juries, see infra notes
141–42 and accompanying text, by the “impartial jury” requirement of the Sixth
Amendment to the Constitution, see infra notes 124–26 and accompanying text, and
on civil juries through the Supreme Court’s application of Sixth Amendment princi-
ples in the civil context, see infra notes 127–35, and its supervisory authority, see infra
note 130 and accompanying text, and the requirements of the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1.
2010] CHALLENGING FELON JURY EXCLUSION 317
form New York’s jury system aimed at expanding the jury pool and
increasing participation by citizen jurors. Part Three presents via-
ble constitutional challenges to the exclusion under the fair-cross-
section requirement and the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses. Felon jury exclusion suffers all the infirmities of an unsus-
tainable policy. In light of its effects and constitutional flaws, the
policy should be re-examined.
I. BANISHED FROM DEMOCRACY
New York’s felon jury exclusion law works to the detriment of
the democratic process and creates a class of permanent political
exiles, disproportionately concentrated in poor urban
communities.
Anyone with a felony-conviction history is disqualified from
the jury pool in New York for life. The New York statute plainly
states, “to qualify as a juror a person must . . . [n]ot have been
convicted of a felony.”14 New York defines “felon” as anyone con-
victed of a crime for which he or she could have been sentenced to
incarceration for a year or more.15 This requirement is uniform for
all juries in the New York State court system.16
This policy stands in contrast to New York’s restoration of con-
victed individuals’ right to vote upon completion of her sentence
of incarceration or period of parole.17 Felon jury exclusion creates
14 N.Y. JUD. LAW § 510(3).
15 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00(5) (McKinney 2009). An individual convicted of any
crime for which he or she could have received a sentence of a year or more incarcera-
tion but was actually sentenced to probation or a lesser period is nevertheless disquali-
fied from the jury pool for life. For example, crimes that describe drug use,
possession, and sale in small quantities are all felonies under New York Penal Law,
with sentencing left to the discretion of judges. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.46 (McKin-
ney 2008) (Criminal injection of a narcotic drug); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 221.20 (McKin-
ney 2008) (Criminal possession of marihuana in the third degree—more than 8
ounces); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 221.45 (McKinney 2008) (Criminal sale of marihuana in
the third degree—more than 25 grams).
16 See N.Y. JUD. LAW § 510(3).
17 The New York statute provides:
No person who has been convicted of a felony pursuant to the laws of
this state, shall have the right to register for or vote at any election un-
less he shall have been pardoned or restored to the rights of citizenship
by the governor, or his maximum sentence of imprisonment has ex-
pired, or he has been discharged from parole. The governor, however,
may attach as a condition to any such pardon a provision that any such
person shall not have the right of suffrage until it shall have been sepa-
rately restored to him.
N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 5-106(2) (McKinney 2007). See Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F.3d 305 (2d
Cir. 2006) (en banc), for a challenge to this statute as a violation of the Voting Rights
Act. In Hayden v. Paterson, 594 F.3d 150, 164–65, 171 (2d Cir. 2010), the Second Cir-
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a permanent bar to participation in one of the foundational insti-
tutions of American democracy.
Before the proliferation of the penitentiary for physically ex-
cluding law-breakers from society, “civil death” was generally im-
posed in continental Europe on a case-by-case basis on those whose
offenses were serious enough to warrant exclusion but not serious
enough for the death penalty to be imposed.18 It entailed, among
other things, the permanent loss of the right to vote, to enter into
contracts, and to inherit or bequeath property; the offender was
treated as if already dead.19 Today almost all individuals convicted
of crimes in the United States return to society in a physical sense,
some immediately following conviction, but their citizenship rights
return in a much more limited sense. Felon jury exclusion is one of
a constellation of permanent disabilities imposed on those with
conviction histories.20 Although governments that assign such disa-
bilities do not exile those who have run afoul of the law in penal
colonies or physically exclude them from the population,21 upon
release from prison or discharge from non-incarceration sentences
individuals with conviction histories find themselves in an internal
exile disturbingly similar to “civil death.”22
Jury exclusion applies to those who have been incarcerated
and those who have not. All individuals living in New York commu-
nities who have histories of being convicted of crimes for which
they could have been sentenced to a year in prison are excluded
from the jury pool, regardless of the age of the conviction, where
the conviction occurred, or the sentence the individual actually re-
ceived. An individual convicted of a felony as a young adult contin-
ues to be excluded from the jury pool until his or her death.23
cuit dismissed the claims that New York’s felon disenfranchisement statute was a viola-
tion of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments while acknowledging that
disenfranchisement statutes, when first enacted, were motivated in part by discrimina-
tory intent against citizens who were not white. For an overview and history of felon
disenfranchisement in United States, see Nora V. Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile:
The Need for Restrictions on Collateral Sentencing Consequences, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV.
153, 154–61 (1999) [hereinafter Internal Exile]. For recent trends tending to make
felon disenfranchisement less prevalent in states nationwide, see generally Pamela S.
Karlan, Convictions and Doubts: Retribution, Representation, and the Debate over Felon Disen-
franchisement, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1147, 1150–64 (2003–2004).
18 See Internal Exile, supra note 17, at 154.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 The federal government excludes immigrants who carry foreign criminal con-
victions. See Nora V. Demleitner, Thwarting a New Start? Foreign Convictions, Sentencing
and Collateral Sanctions, 36 U. TOL. L. REV. 505, 506–09 (2005).
22 See Internal Exile, supra note 17, at 154–55.
23 There is a narrow exception. See supra note 3.
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Felon jury exclusion, as a lifetime infirmity, applies to individuals
convicted under New York statutes later held unconstitutional, re-
moved from the penal law, or reclassified as misdemeanors.24
Since 1977, the year that New York’s jury qualification law was
last revised and felon exclusion deliberately retained,25 the number
of people touched by the criminal justice system in the United
States and in New York State has exploded. In 2008, the United
States had more than 7.3 million adults—one in 31—under crimi-
nal justice supervision.26 In New York State in 2007, the latest year
for which data is available, there were nearly 63,000 people incar-
cerated in state prisons, 30,000 detained in local jails, 123,000 on
probation, and another 43,000 under parole supervision.27 If cur-
rent national incarceration trends continue, an estimated 1 in 15
people born in 2001 will serve time in state or federal prison dur-
ing their lifetime.28
There has also been a dramatic expansion of the number of
felony prosecutions since New York’s jury qualifications were re-
formed in 1977.29 State court felony filings increased 36% between
1978 and 1984.30 The increase accelerated in the 1980s: between
1985 and 1991, felony filings rose by more than 50%.31
Available data about how many people have histories of being
24 Telephone Interview with Elissa Krauss, supra note 3. Individuals convicted of
felonies in other jurisdictions that would not have been felonies in New York are
likewise excluded. Even when the judge who hears the details of a particular case
determines that incarceration is unwarranted or would not serve the purposes of the
criminal law, if the judge could have sentenced the defendant to a year in prison for
the crime of which the defendant has been convicted, New York’s felon jury exclusion
statute applies. See N.Y. JUD. LAW § 510(3) (McKinney 2003); N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 10.00(5) (McKinney 2008).
25 See infra notes 89–94 and accompanying text.
26 THE PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, ONE IN 31: THE LONG REACH OF AMERICAN
CORRECTIONS 5 (2009), http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/PSPP_
1in31_report_FINAL_WEB_3-26-09.pdf.
27 NEW YORK STATE DIV. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVS., NEW YORK STATE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 2007 CRIMESTAT REPORT, 32–40 (Mar. 2008), http://www.criminaljustice.state.
ny.us/pio/annualreport/2007crimestatreport.pdf.
28 THOMAS P. BONCZAR, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PUBL’N NO. NCJ 197976, PREVA-
LENCE OF IMPRISONMENT IN THE U.S. POPULATION, 1974–2001, 7 (2003), http://bjs.ojp.
usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=836.
29 See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV.
505, 536 (2001).
30 NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS: ANNUAL
REPORT 1984, 189–90 tbl.35 (1986), available at http://contentdm.ncsconline.org/
cdm4/item_viewer.php?CISOROOT=/ctadmin&CISOPTR=609&REC=2.
31 NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS: ANNUAL RE-
PORT 1991, 37 tbl.1.25 (1993), available at http://contentdm.ncsconline.org/cdm4/
item_viewer.php?CISOROOT=/ctadmin&CISOPTR=616&REC=1.
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convicted or placed under correctional supervision is more specu-
lative than data about who is currently under such supervision.
Based on demographic life tables, researchers estimate that there
are approximately 11.7 million former felons nationwide, plus 4.4
million individuals who have been convicted of felonies that were
currently under criminal justice supervision as of 2004.32 A total of
approximately 16.1 million people nationwide made up this “felon
class,” approximately 7% of the adult population.33 In 1978, ap-
proximately 4.7 million people had felony-conviction histories, ap-
proximately 3% of the adult population.34
The criminal justice system has disparate impact by race and
gender. One in 18 men was under correctional supervision in
2008, compared to one in 89 women.35 The impact of the criminal
justice system on men has increased over the last three decades: in
1978, 5% of the adult male population had felony-conviction histo-
ries; in 2004, 13%.36
The racially skewed impacts of the criminal justice system have
long been accepted as fact by researchers.37 Courts, too, have come
to accept that criminal justice systems discriminate by race.38 A re-
port by the Pew Center on the States underscores serious discrep-
ancies when the numbers of those under correctional supervision
in 2008 were dissected by race and gender. Nationwide, 1 in 11
African American adults and 1 in 27 Hispanic adults are under cor-
32 See Uggen et al., supra note 10, at 290 tbl.2.
33 Id. at 288 fig.2.
34 Id. at 290 tbl.2.
35 See THE PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, supra note 26, at 7.
36 See Uggen et al., supra note 10, at 290 tbl.2.
37 See generally, e.g., TODD CLEAR, IMPRISONING COMMUNITIES: HOW MASS INCARCERA-
TION MAKES DISADVANTAGED NEIGHBORHOODS WORSE 63–67 (2007); DAVID COLE, NO
EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1999);
John Donohue III & Steven Levitt, The Impact of Race on Policing and Arrests, 44 J.L. &
ECON. 367 (2001); Mary Romero, State Violence, and the Social and Legal Construction of
Latino Criminality: From El Bandido to Gang Member, 78 DENV. U. L. REV. 1081, 1088–98
(2001).
38 The federal district court for the Eastern District of Washington State and the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals have both accepted evidence of racial discrimination
in Washington’s criminal justice system. See Farrakhan v. Gregoire, 590 F.3d 989, 1009
–12 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Washington’s criminal justice system adversely affects minorities
to a greater extent than non-minorities . . . this differential effect cannot be explained
by factors other than racial discrimination.”); Farrakhan v. Gregoire, No. CV-96-076-
RHW, 2006 WL 1889273, at *4–6 (E.D. Wash. Jul. 7, 2006); see generally Kevin R. John-
son, How Racial Profiling in America Became the Law of the Land: United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce and Whren v. United States and the Need for Truly Rebellious Lawyering, 98 GEO. L.J.
1005 (2010) (explaining that the U.S. Supreme Court has promoted racial profiling
in immigration enforcement and traffic stops).
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rectional supervision, compared to 1 in 45 whites.39 The likelihood
of a person in 2001 serving time in federal or state prison rises to 1
in 6 for Hispanic males and to 1 in 3 for African American males.40
African American males born from 1965 to 1969 were more likely
to have prison records in 2004 (22%) than either military records
(17%) or bachelor’s degrees (13%).41 Professor Christopher Ug-
gen’s projections on who was in the “felon class” in 2006 and 1978
are illustrative: in 1978, almost 8% of African Americans and 13%
of African American males were in the felon class; by 2004, the
class had exploded to include 22% of African American adults and
33% of African American adult males.42
It is hard to capture what precise effect felon jury exclusion
has on racial representativeness of particular juries but it certainly
contributes to disparities visible in New York’s juries. Based on
2000 Census counts, Blacks and Latinos in New York are prose-
cuted, convicted, and sentenced to incarceration at rates substan-
tially disproportionate to whites: although Blacks constituted
15.9% of the state population, they comprised 54.3% of the prison
population and 50.0% of the parolee population in New York; al-
though Latinos constituted 15.1% of the state population, they
comprised 26.7% of the prison population and 32.0% of the pa-
rolee population in New York; and although whites constituted
62.0% of the state population, they comprised only 16.0% of pris-
oners and parolees.43 Collectively, Blacks and Latinos constituted
81.0% of the total prison population in 2000 and 82.0% of the total
parolee population, despite being only 31.0% of the overall state
population.44
The exclusion’s racial impacts have ripple effects that under-
mine the legitimacy of the judicial system in the eyes of minority
communities.45 The Supreme Court has called the confidence of
citizens “the very foundation of our system of justice.”46 Empirical
evidence suggests that members of some underrepresented groups
have less confidence in the fairness of the jury system than do
39 See THE PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, supra note 26.
40 BONCZAR, supra note 28, at 8 fig.4.
41 Becky Pettit & Bruce Western, Mass Imprisonment and the Life Course: Race and
Class Inequality in U.S. Incarceration, 69 AM. SOC. REV. 151, 164 tbl.6 (2004).
42 Uggen et al., supra note 10.
43 Hayden v. Paterson, 594 F.3d 150, 160 (2d Cir. 2010).
44 Id.
45 See Kevin Johnson, Hernandez v. Texas: Legacies of Justice and Injustice, 25 CHICANO-
LATINO L. REV. 153, 193 (2005) (discussing the felon jury exclusion’s effect of under-
mining the legitimacy of the judicial system in the eyes of the Latina/o community).
46 Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 49 (1992).
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members of well-represented groups. For example, a nationwide
poll of nearly 800 people who had served on civil and criminal ju-
ries revealed that African American and white participants have
fundamentally different views about the influence of race on jury
verdicts, with African Americans perceiving the system as heavily
weighted against minorities.47 Just under two-thirds of the African
American respondents believed that minority criminal defendants
receive unfair trials, while just under one-third of the white partici-
pants agreed.48 Nearly 70% of the African American jurors polled
believed that the justice system is more likely to impose the death
penalty unfairly on persons of color than on white defendants.49 In
addition, more than 60% of the African American respondents felt
that white plaintiffs experience fairer treatment in civil trials than
do minority plaintiffs.50 More than two-thirds of African American
jurors polled suggested that juries award more money to white
plaintiffs than they award to African American, Asian, or Latino
plaintiffs for comparable injuries.51
This study found the following stark explanation offered by
African American participant-jurors for why they believe minorities
receive such unfair treatment: “the [jury] system is run predomi-
nantly by whites.”52 There appears to be a powerful correlation be-
tween the representativeness of jury venires and public confidence
in the fairness of the justice system.53
Blanket felon jury exclusion leaves those with conviction histo-
47 Arthur Austin, Racial Divide Affects Black, White Panelists, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 22, 1993,
at S8–S9.
48 Id. at S8.
49 Id. at S9.
50 Id. at S8.
51 Id.
52 Racial Divide Affects Black, supra note 47 at S8.
53 The rebellion in Los Angeles following the acquittal of four police officers in
the Rodney King beating by a jury that included no African Americans is an unusually
dramatic, but nonetheless familiar, example of how non-representative tribunals
erode public confidence in the legal system. More recently, another California jury
with no African Americans acquitted of murder the officer who shot twenty-two year
old Oscar Grant to death on the Fruitvale BART platform while he lay face down.
Demian Bulwa, Verdict: Jury finds former BART officer guilty of involuntary manslaughter
charge, S.F. CHRON., Jul. 9, 2010, at A1. The officer was convicted of involuntary man-
slaughter. Id. Again, taking to the streets was the public’s response to the verdict. Id.;
see also Tanya Coke, Note, Lady Justice May Be Blind, But Is She A Soul Sister? Race Neutral-
ity and the Ideal of Representative Juries, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 327 (1994) (discussing the
prevalence of all-white juries in the United States in the twenty-first century, despite
the perception that the U.S. Constitution promises a jury of “peers,” and positing that
the Court’s non-discrimination principles in the area of jury selection are putting
minority defendants and victims at a disadvantage).
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ries geographically outside the borders of American democracy.54
Studies of the effects of the criminal justice system on the local
level show that, even in a single city, the effects are undeniably felt
disproportionately by a small number of neighborhoods. Fourteen
of the fifty-nine community districts in New York City (“NYC”),
home to only 17% of NYC’s adult male residents, account for over
50% of all adult males sent to New York State prisons each year
from NYC.55 These neighborhoods are concentrated in three dis-
tinct areas of NYC: northern Manhattan, northeastern Brooklyn,
and the South Bronx.56 These communities within the borders of
New York State are distinguished from the rest of the nation in
their connection to and participation in the foundational institu-
tions of democratic process by the aggregation of geographic con-
centrations of criminal convictions and the citizenship-limiting
effects of such practices as felon jury exclusion. Professor George
Fletcher discusses “political disenfranchisement [as] a technique
for reinforcing the branding of felons as the untouchable class of
American society . . . permanently banished from the political com-
54 See James M. Binnall, Sixteen Million Angry Men: Reviving a Dead Doctrine to Chal-
lenge the Constitutionality of Excluding Felons from Jury Service, 17 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 1,
39–41 (2009) (discussing the isolating effect of felon jury exclusion on the formerly
incarcerated). The restricted citizenship rights of citizens with conviction histories
parallel the denial of rights to permanent residents, with one crucial difference—
permanent residents have the possibility of changing their status through naturaliza-
tion while U.S. citizens with criminal conviction histories have no hope of changing
their histories. See Internal Exile, supra note 17, at 158–59.
55 See Justice Mapping Ctr., High Resettlement Neighborhoods: New York City (Oct.
2006), http://www.justicemapping.org/expertise/ (follow “NYC Analysis – Oct. 2006”
hyperlink); CLEAR, supra note 37 (discussing corrosive effects of the criminal justice
system on the communities from which a concentrated number of those incarcerated
in the United States come from and return to). Clear points out the effects of mass
incarceration on the internal society of communities–social disorganization, coercive
mobility, a lack of public safety, and effects on human capital and social networks. Id.
at 69–91. Permanent alienation from the democratic institution of jury service further
isolates these communities and their problems and pressures. See id.
56 As an example, the neighborhood of Brownsville is situated in Brooklyn’s 16th
Community District. This neighborhood is among those with Brooklyn’s highest pro-
portion of residents living below the federal poverty line. The residents who live in
District 16 are nearly all people of color. During 2003, 1 in 20 adult men in Brooklyn’s
16th Community District was admitted to jail or prison—14 of every 1,000 adult men
with a Brownsville address were admitted to a state prison and 38 of every 1,000 were
admitted to a city jail at least one time. This figure does not reflect those living in the
District who are on parole, probation or other community supervision. Even more
troubling, 1 in every 12 young men between the ages of 16 and 24 go to either prison
or jail from this District every year. JUSTICE MAPPING CTR., supra note 55; see also CLEAR,
supra note 37, at 65–67 (discussing Tallahassee).
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munity.”57 The localized effects of the criminal justice system send
whole communities “the message that they are inherently unrelia-
ble members of the democracy.”58
Excluding those with felony-conviction histories from the jury
pool denies those individuals and the communities they live in an
opportunity for participating in a key democratic process. It adds
force to the effects of the U.S. Census Bureau’s practice of count-
ing prisoners in the communities where they are incarcerated as
opposed to the communities that they come from for the purposes
of districting.59 Those incarcerated outside their communities in
57 George Fletcher, Disenfranchisement as Punishment: Reflections on the Racial Uses of
Infamia, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1895, 1898–99(1999).
58 Id. at 1898. Professor Fletcher goes on to describe the role of incarceration in a
democratically governed society:
The challenge of recognizing that we implicitly endorse a caste system
in criminal law is to reformulate our theories of punishment. The em-
phasis on reintegration into society should come front and center. . . .
[W]e should be encouraging inmates to begin thinking of themselves as
useful members of society with all the attendant responsibilities.
Id. at 1907. Although he is addressing the franchise specifically, his words ring even
truer in the context of jury service—while voting is merely a right, jury duty is an
obligation of citizenship. The political incidents of citizenship are jealously guarded
from those not qualified under the law to hold them. At a recent City University of
New York National Lawyer’s Guild student-chapter sponsored Know Your Rights work-
shop on constitutional rights in police and pedestrian encounters at an artist collec-
tive in Brooklyn, a young African American male participant, unprompted, shared the
following story with the author: his brother had been arrested and served time for a
crime and had subsequently received a New York Juror Questionnaire. Among the
questions asked in the questionnaire is, “Have you ever been convicted of a felony?”
N.Y. State Unified Court System, Juror Qualification Questionnaire, http://www.
nycourtsystem.com/applications/qualify/ (follow “Please click here to continue and
submit your Qualification Questionnaire” hyperlink, then enter requested informa-
tion) (last visited Sept. 11, 2010). As this participant understood what happened, his
brother had answered this question incorrectly—by checking the box marked “No”
when he should have checked “Yes”—and was charged with perjury for his incorrect
answer. He was convicted of the perjury charge and was incarcerated for four months.
There are many reasons that an individual might answer such a question incorrectly:
he might not understand that the crime of which he had been convicted is a “felony”
under the law, he might not realize that he was actually convicted if he took a plea to
the charges or was sentenced to time served, he might forget a long-ago conviction.
Assuming this story is true, the fact that a prosecutor took advantage of such a mistake
to charge, prosecute and convict this person suggests that New York’s felon jury exclu-
sion law is creating a situation where a class of New Yorkers are permanently vulnera-
ble to involvement in the criminal justice system.
59 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, FACTS ABOUT CENSUS 2000 RESIDENCE RULES, http://
www.census.gov/population/www/censusdata/resid_rules.html#Inst (last visited
Sept. 11, 2010). Professor Pamela S. Karlan explains how this policy silences
communities:
[T]he interaction of incarceration and disenfranchisement can skew
the balance of political power within a state. The Census Bureau counts
inmates where they are incarcerated. The population figures the Bu-
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institutions in upstate New York are disenfranchised and yet simul-
taneously counted as residents in the communities where they are
held during incarceration.60 These additional bodies inflate the
population of communities that host prisons, adding to their repre-
sentation and tax base through the districting process. At the same
time, the home communities of those incarcerated at the time of
the Census are reduced by the number of their regular residents
who have been forcibly migrated outside the community.61 The ge-
ographic effect of this double disenfranchisement leaves communi-
ties adrift.
Members of the founding generation construed jury service to
be central to the process of democracy. Thomas Jefferson de-
scribed the jury as the “school by which the people learn the exer-
cise of civic duties as well as rights.”62 James Wilson, a Philadelphia
jurist and signer of the U.S. Constitution, understood that through
jury service voters “come to know, to shape, and thus to admire the
law.”63 Alexis de Tocqueville, writing after a tour of the United
States in 1835, wrote, “the jury, which is the most energetic means
reau provides are used by states to draw legislative districts. Because
every state but Maine and Vermont disenfranchises individuals while
they are incarcerated, people in prison serve as essentially inert ballast
in the redistricting process. Especially given the prevalent practice of
building prisons far away from the cities where most inmates lived
before they were sent to prison, these practices increase the power of
officials who have no reason to represent these only notional “constitu-
ents.” At the same time, incarceration reduces the population of the
communities from which inmates come, and to which most of them re-
turn, thereby diminishing those communities’ entitlement to legislative
seats and legislative clout.
Pamela S. Karlan, Ballots and Bullets: The Exceptional History of the Right to Vote, 71 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1345, 1364–65 (2003).
60 See supra note 17.
61 This practice may soon be ending locally. New York joins Maryland and Dela-
ware as the only states in which those incarcerated are counted in the communities
they come from, not the communities to which they are sent, at least for districting
purposes at the state level. On August 3, 2010, the New York Legislature approved a
measure sponsored by Senator Eric Schneiderman and Assembly Member Hakeem
Jeffries that would require that inmates be counted as residents of their home coun-
ties––where nearly all will return—rather than of the areas where they are imprisoned
for New York state and local redistricting. Joel Stashenko, State Set to End Policy of
‘Prison Gerrymandering,’ 244 N.Y. L.J. 1 (col. 3) (Aug. 5, 2010); see S. 6725, 233d Leg.
Sess. (N.Y. 2010); A. 9834, 233d Sess. Law (N.Y. 2010); see also Prisoners of the Census,
http://www.prisonersofthecensus.org/newyork.html#leg. Federal districting is not af-
fected by this legislation.
62 KERBER, supra note 2, at 129.
63 Id. “Perhaps more than any other signer of the Constitution, Wilson linked the
educational function of the jury with the claim of the people to judge for themselves.”
Id. at 229 n.22.
326 NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:313
of making the people rule, is also the most efficacious means of
teaching it to rule well.”64
There is modern empirical evidence suggesting that people
who have served on juries believe that they have benefited from
that service and that they have more respect for the courts than
people who have not served on juries.65 At least one court has
given credence to the rehabilitative value of jury participation: in
2006, a Colorado court reasoned that a state statute that allowed
those with felony-conviction histories to serve on petit juries was
rationally related to the legislative purpose of rehabilitating con-
victed felons and reintegrating them into society once their punish-
ment was complete.66
Experts making recommendations about jury service for those
with conviction histories agree. In 1967, a Presidential Task Force
on Corrections stated, “[t]here seems little justification for . . . per-
manently disqualifying all convicted felons from serving as jurors,”
and recommended that, for selection of jurors for all juries,
[r]eliance should instead be placed primarily on the powers
given both parties to challenge jurors, since they and the judge
are in a position to consider the relevance of a particular case.
The legislature might prescribe certain convictions as grounds
for challenge for cause; the judge could allow other convictions
to constitute such grounds according to their relevance to the
case. In addition, it might be appropriate for the legislature to
provide for disqualification in certain cases at least for some pe-
riod of years.67
More recently, the American Bar Association (“ABA”), in its
recommendations for jury pool limitations for all juries, urged that
only those who have been convicted of a felony and are in actual
confinement or on probation, parole, or other court supervision
be excluded.68 In the ABA’s view, the desire for a jury representa-
tive of the population outweighs the effect that the presence of
64 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 268 (Henry Reeve trans.,
Lawbook Exchange 2003) (1838).
65 Ellen E. Sward, Justification and Doctrinal Evolution, 37 CONN. L. REV. 389, 467
(2004).
66 People v. Ellis, 148 P.3d 205, 210 (Colo. App. 2006), cert. denied, 2006 WL
3393584 (Colo. Nov. 27, 2006).
67 Brian Kalt, The Exclusion of Felons from Jury Service, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 65, 142
(2003–2004) (quoting TASK FORCE ON CORR., PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENFORCE-
MENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS 90 (1967)).
68 AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, THE ABA PRINCIPLES FOR JURIES AND JURY TRIALS 8 (2004),
http://www.abanet.org/juryprojectstandards/The_ABA_Principles_for_Juries_and_
Jury_Trials.pdf.
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felons on juries may have on the public’s respect for the process or
the bias introduced into jury deliberations.69
Successful policy models for felon jury inclusion exist through-
out the United States.70 Despite the inclusion of individuals with
felony-conviction histories in the jury pools of nearly half of U.S.
jurisdictions,71 there has been no failing of the judicial process nor
any sign that unsound jury verdicts result from including individu-
als with conviction histories in the pool of those qualified to serve
on a civil or criminal jury. Through the blanket felon jury exclu-
sion statute, New York is contributing to the disempowerment of
communities and trampling on individuals’ constitutional rights in
the service of protecting against an unsubstantiated rhetorical
harm.
II. HISTORY OF NEW YORK’S JURY POOL
A. Evolution of Felon Jury Exclusion in New York
Prior to 1940, jury selection in New York was achieved through
different systems in each different county of the City and the State.
A “key man” in each county was responsible for calling jurors to
serve and insuring that those called were of a sufficiently high “cali-
ber” to have the privilege and the power.72 Although no standard
69 Id.
70 As of 2003, no one was excluded from jury pools in Maine, not even those who
are incarcerated at the time when they are called to serve. Kalt, supra note 67, at 153.
Alaska, Idaho, Indiana, Minnesota, North Carolina, North Dakota, Rhode Island,
South Dakota, Washington, and Wisconsin included everyone in the jury pool except
people under correctional supervision (parole, probation or incarceration). Id. at
150–57. Those with felony-conviction histories in Illinois and Iowa were included in
the jury pool but challengeable for cause. Id. at 142. Arizona included first time of-
fenders in all its jury pools. Id. at 141. Colorado had no felon jury exclusion at all for
the petit jury pool. Id. at 151. Oregon included individuals with felony-conviction his-
tories in the civil jury pool. Id. at 156. Connecticut, D.C., Kansas, Massachusetts, and
Oregon included felons but imposed waiting periods. Id. at 151–56.
71 As of 2003, twenty U.S. jurisdictions included those with a history of felony con-
viction in their jury pools. Kalt, supra note 67, at 71. Some states have recently re-
formed their jury qualification statutes to include those with conviction histories in
the pool. The Colorado legislature repealed Colorado’s felon jury exclusion statute in
1989. Id. at 151 (citing COLO. REV. STAT. § 78-1-1 (1963)). The Washington legislature
wrote statutes restoring the right to serve on a jury automatically upon completion of
a sentence for an offense committed after July 1, 1984. WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 2.36.070(5), 9.94A.637 (West 2009). Oregon adopted constitutional provision by a
citizen initiative in 1999 that automatically restores the right to serve on a jury 15
years after a felony conviction or the completion of a sentence of incarceration. OR.
CONST. art. I § 45(1). In 1993, the North Dakota legislature made changes that al-
lowed felons to serve on juries after incarceration, limited only by a challenge for
cause. See City of Mandan v. Baer, 578 N.W.2d 559, 563 (N.D. 1998).
72 Until recently, many state and all federal courts selected jury venires through
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set of qualifications or disqualifications had been promulgated or
standard procedure required, potential jurors “possessing all other
qualifications which are or may be required or prescribed by law”
have been protected from discrimination “on account of race,
creed or color” by law since 1895:
[A]ny person charged with any duty in the selection or sum-
moning of jurors who shall exclude or fail to summon any citi-
zen [on account of race, creed or color] shall, on conviction
thereof, be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and be fined not
less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dol-
lars or imprisoned not less than thirty days, nor more than
ninety days, or both such fine and imprisonment.73
Juror qualifications for counties in New York City were first
standardized in 1940.74 Before standardization, any disqualification
was at the discretion of the Commissioner, the “key man” for the
county.75 New York then had a practice of impaneling “blue-rib-
bon” juries for cases of high interest.76 From July 1, 1937, to June
30, 1946, these special juries convicted in 79% of the cases while
the general juries convicted in 57%.77 Blue-ribbon juries were
the key-man system. Under this system, citizens of good standing (the ‘key’ persons
after whom the system is named) recommend to the court people in the community
who will make responsible jurors. Notwithstanding that the highly subjective nature of
the key persons’ decisions make this system inherently susceptible to discrimination,
the Supreme Court has held that key-man systems are not unconstitutional per se.
Carter v. Jury Comm’n, 396 U.S. 320, 331–37 (1970). But key-man systems violate the
Equal Protection Clause if they meet certain conditions, including impermissible mo-
tivation. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 499–501 (1977). No state in recent years
has successfully defended a key-man system having a nontrivial disparate racial impact
before the U.S. Supreme Court.
73 N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 13 (Banks Law Publishing Co. 1909).
74 See N.Y. JUD. LAW § 596 (McKinney 1940).
75 See supra notes 72–73 and accompanying text.
76 New York’s special jury statutes then allowed the impaneling of blue-ribbon ju-
ries for special cases. These special juries have been termed “blue ribbon” to connote
a jury composed of individuals of considerable education and business experience.
Frederick F. Lewis, Constitutional Law—Use of “Blue Ribbon” Juries in State Courts, 26
TEX. L. REV. 533, 534 (1948). Blue-ribbon juries were used for particularly important
or intricate cases or where “the issue to be tried has been so widely commented upon
that an ordinary jury cannot without delay and difficulty be obtained” or that for any
other reason “the due, efficient and impartial administration of justice in the particu-
lar case would be advanced by the trial of such an issue by a special jury.” Fay v. New
York, 332 U.S. 261, 268–69 (1947). Blue-ribbon jurors had to be selected from those
accepted for the general panel by the county clerk, subpoenaed for a personal ap-
pearance and had to testify under oath as to his or her qualification and fitness. Id. at
267. The then-extant special juror statute prescribed standards for their selection by
the clerk after such a subpoena. These standards allowed the New York City jury clerk
to narrow the jury panel from approximately 60,000 qualified jurors to approximately
3,000 qualified blue-ribbon jurors. Lewis, supra at 534.
77 Moore v. New York, 333 U.S. 565, 566–67 (1948).
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widely criticized and repeatedly challenged in the courts.78 In re-
sponse, New York started to reform the jury system with the aim of
eliminating the need for blue-ribbon juries: a bill was introduced
which made changes to the general juror procedure with the ex-
plicit intention of making all juries more like the blue-ribbon juries
in “calib[er].”79 The explicit objective of reform was to provide the
courts with “juries of high character and caliber.”80
The new procedure included personal interviews with the Jury
Commissioner. Those who he deemed to be of sufficiently high
caliber would be allowed to serve. Individuals who had been “con-
victed of a felony or a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude”
were newly disqualified by law from jury service.81 The Citizen’s
Crime Commission of the State of New York approved the bill
while drawing attention to the “difficulties and discrimination” that
the differential disqualification would lead to: “What difference
does it make whether he has stolen $99 worth of goods or $101. In
the first case he would be guilty of a misdemeanor (not involving
moral turpitude), in the second case a felony.”82 The first would
not be disqualified, but the second would. To resolve this unequal
treatment, the Commission suggested disqualifying all misdemean-
ants as well,83 but the bill was passed as written.84 The ambiguous
78 See, e.g., id. (holding that blue-ribbon juries do not violate the U.S. Constitu-
tion); Fay, 332 U.S. at 261 (upholding the constitutionality of blue-ribbon juries).
79 Letter from Francis J. Sinnott, County Clerk, County of Kings Clerk’s Office, to
the Honorable Nathan R. Sobel, Counsel to the Governor, Executive Chamber, (Mar.
16, 1940) (microformed in Bill Jacket, L. 1940, ch. 202, at 22) (on file with the New
York Public Library: Science, Industry and Business Library); Letter from Leonard S.
Saxe, Executive Secretary, to the Honorable Nathan R. Sobel, Counsel to the Gover-
nor, Executive Chamber (Mar. 14, 1940) (microformed in Bill Jacket, L. 1940, ch.
202, at 19–20) (on file with the New York Public Library: Science, Industry and Busi-
ness Library); NEW YORK COUNTY LAWYER’S ASSOCIATION COMMITTEE ON STATE LEGIS-
LATION, REPORT NO. 172 (1940) (microformed in Bill Jacket, L. 1940, ch. 202, at 14
–15) (on file with the New York Public Library: Science, Industry and Business
Library).
80 N.Y. JUD. LAW § 596 (1940), amended by 1940 N.Y. Laws ch. 202; see also COMMIT-
TEE ON CRIMINAL COURTS LAW AND PROCEDURE OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE
CITY OF NEW YORK, REPORT NO. 65 (1940) (microformed in Bill Jacket, L. 1940, ch.
202, at 7, 10–11) (on file with the New York Public Library: Science, Industry and
Business Library).
81 N.Y. JUD. LAW § 596 (1940), amended by 1940 N.Y. Laws ch. 202; ASSOCIATION OF
THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, COMMITTEE ON STATE LEGISLATION, REPORT NO. 47
(1940) (microformed in Bill Jacket, L. 1940, ch. 202, at 4) (on file with the New York
Public Library: Science, Industry and Business Library).
82 Letter from the Citizens’ Crime Commission to the Honorable Herbert Leh-
man, Governor (Mar. 16, 1940) (microformed in Bill Jacket, L. 1940, ch. 202, at 2–3)
(on file with the New York Public Library: Science, Industry and Business Library).
83 Id.
84 See N.Y. JUD. LAW § 596 (1940), amended by 1940 N.Y. Laws ch. 202.
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“felony or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude” disqualifica-
tion later also became law for juries in NYC.85 In 1955, a statute was
added governing juror qualifications outside NYC, which also in-
cluded a disqualification for those convicted of a “felony or a mis-
demeanor involving moral turpitude.”86
The 1940 statute was amended twice before it was replaced
completely: the first amendment removed a property owner re-
quirement87 and the second lowered the age requirement to 18.88
Both amendments made more individuals eligible for jury service.
In 1977, when New York’s entire jury selection system was
again restructured, it was repealed completely. Restructuring fol-
lowed the Federal Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968 (“JSSA”)
objective: “to promote greater citizen participation in the civil and
criminal jury system.”89 Statistics then showed that “women, young
people and minorities [were] under-represented in grand juries.”90
The New York statute and the JSSA were both designed to meet the
constitutional requirement that juries be selected from a fair cross
section of the community in the district or division wherein the
court convenes.91 The focus shifted from the “caliber” of juries to
the “inclusiveness” of the jury pool. Interviews for all potential ju-
rors were eliminated and replaced with interviews only for those
who wish to be excused from jury service.92 The New York law pres-
ently contains the following language:
It is the policy of this state that all litigants in the courts of this
state entitled to trial by jury shall have the right to grand and
petit juries selected at random from a fair cross-section of the
community in the county or other governmental subdivision
wherein the court convenes; and that all eligible citizens shall
have the opportunity to serve on grand and petit juries in the
courts of this state, and shall have an obligation to serve when
85 Id.
86 N.Y. JUD. LAW § 596 (1940), amended by 1955 N.Y. Laws ch. 797.
87 N.Y. JUD. LAW § 596 (1940), amended by 1967 N.Y. Laws ch. 49.
88 N.Y. JUD. LAW § 596 (1940), amended by 1974 N.Y. Laws ch. 890.
89 Memorandum of the Office of Court Administration (microformed in Bill
Jacket, L. 1977, ch. 316, at 148) (on file with the New York Public Library: Science,
Industry and Business Library).
90 Letter from Milton Beller, Legislative Director, Legal Aid Society, to the Honor-
able Judah Gribetz, Counsel to the Governor, Executive Chamber (June 10, 1977)
(microformed in Bill Jacket, L. 1977, ch. 316) (on file with the New York Public Li-
brary: Science, Industry and Business Library).
91 Id.; N.Y. JUD. LAW § 500 (McKinney 2003); 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (2006).
92 N.Y. JUD. LAW § 512, 1977 N.Y. Laws 1, 4 ch. 316 (McKinney 2009) (repealed
1996).
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summoned for that purpose, unless excused.93
Individuals with felony-conviction histories were disqualified
under the 1977 statute but misdemeanants were no longer disqual-
ified.94 This reduced the number of criminal convictions that
would result in disqualification of potential jurors, but did not simi-
larly reduce the number of persons excluded.95 The conditions
under which the New York legislature opted to include felon jury
exclusion in a jury selection system designed to be inclusive are
starkly different from conditions today. According to Professor Ug-
gen’s projections, in 1978, the felon class included approximately
3% of the national population,96 5% of adult men,97 8% of African
Americans, and 13% of African American men.98 But the explosion
of the “felon class” between 1978 and the present has amplified the
effects of the exclusion far beyond its 1977 scope. By 2004, approxi-
mately 7% of Americans were in the “felon class,”99 including 13%
of adult men, 22% of African American adults and 33% of African
American men. Under New York’s felon jury exclusion statute, they
are all disqualified from the jury pool.100 The scope of disqualifica-
tion created by felon jury exclusion, which may have been reasona-
ble under 1977 conditions, is no longer reasonable and can hardly
be characterized as promoting “citizen participation”101 in the jury
system.
B. Expanding New York’s Jury Pool
In 1995, only 12% of the people who were summoned to jury
duty in New York City appeared in court.102 Judge Judith Kaye, who
was then Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals, recog-
nized that this low turnout rate was having an effect on the repre-
sentativeness and inclusiveness of New York juries, as well as
interfering with courts’ abilities to actually do the work of adminis-
93 N.Y. JUD. LAW § 500 (McKinney 2003).
94 N.Y. JUD. LAW § 510 (McKinney 2003).





100 N.Y. JUD. LAW § 510 (McKinney 2003).
101 See Memorandum of the Office of Court Administration, supra note 89 and ac-
companying text.
102 Robert C. Walters et al., Jury of Our Peers: An Unfulfilled Constitutional Promise, 58
SMU L. REV. 319, 351 (2005).
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tering justice.103 In response, Judge Kaye and the New York legisla-
ture repealed all exemptions from jury service; increased the daily
rate that jurors were paid; required companies with over 20 em-
ployees to pay while their employees fulfilled their jury duty; added
taxpayer, welfare-recipient, and unemployment lists to the lists
from which potential jurors were identified; and hired a national
change-of-address service to track down New Yorkers whose jury
questionnaires had been returned by the U.S. Post Office.104 Five
years after these reforms began, the participation rate of qualified
summoned jurors was up from 12% to 37%.105 Despite the recog-
nized need to expand the jury pool in New York, felon jury inclu-
sion was conspicuously absent from Justice Kaye’s admirable
reforms.106
To make up for the shortage of jurors and to create a more
inclusive and representative jury pool, and to make more jurors
available to fill the crucial democratic role of hearing and deciding
the cases of their fellow New Yorkers, New York courts have re-
formed the jury recruitment process at great administrative and fi-
nancial cost.107 Yet, New York continues to ban a large swath of
citizens from inclusion in the pool through felon jury exclusion.108
In light of Justice Kaye’s goals and her successful efforts to reform
the system, felon jury exclusion is a relic that should be the next
obstacle removed from the path to a process that reliably produces
impartial juries representing a cross section of New York’s
communities.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
The exclusion of individuals with felony-conviction histories
from New York’s jury pool can be challenged not only on ethical
and practical grounds, but also as a violation of constitutional prin-
ciples.109 Even where arguments about the constitutional implica-
103 See Judith S. Kaye, Albany Law Review Symposium: Refinement or Reinvention, The
State of Reform In New York: The Courts, 69 ALB. L. REV. 831, 841, 843 (2006).
104 Walters et al, supra note 102, at 351–52.
105 Id.
106 See id. at 351–54.
107 Id. at 351.
108 N.Y. JUD. LAW § 510(3) (McKinney 2003).
109 Felon jury exclusion may also violate the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (“ICCPR”), which states, “Every citizen shall have the right and the
opportunity . . . without unreasonable restrictions . . . [t]o have access, on general
terms of equality, to public service in his country.” International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, art 25, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), ¶ 21, U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 16 at
52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966); see Kalt, supra note 67, at 142; see also Internal
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tions of felon jury exclusion might not lead courts to declare it
unconstitutional, recognition of such implications should have suf-
ficient rhetorical and persuasive power to cause policymakers to
reject it as undesirable or politically impractical. Given the dispa-
rate racial effects of the statute, its extreme impact on minority
communities’ access to the judicial process, as well as the goals of
inclusiveness and representativeness enshrined in the jury selection
statutes and the policies of the courts themselves, felon jury exclu-
sion seems ripe for legislative reform.
This Part will address the most severe constitutional infirmities
of the statute—its violation of the fair-cross-section requirement,110
its infringement on litigants’ and jurors’ Equal Protection rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment,111 and the introduction of bias
into the judicial process that threatens the Due Process rights112 of
defendants and civil litigants.
Felon jury exclusion is likely a violation of the constitutional
fair-cross-section requirement. A jury selected from a pool that rep-
resents a “fair cross section on the venire” is a gloss on the “impar-
tial jury” due a criminal defendant under the Sixth Amendment.113
The fair-cross-section requirement applies to civil juries through
the Supreme Court’s application of Sixth Amendment principles
in the civil context, its supervisory authority, and the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.114 A pool that represents a
“fair cross section of the community” is explicitly required by New
York law for all juries.115 Felon jury exclusion, which interferes with
a fair and reasonable representation of community members with
conviction histories and minorities in the jury pool, is an impermis-
sible violation of this requirement.116
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
protects both litigants and prospective jurors from government ac-
tion based on irrational or protected classifications. Felon jury ex-
clusion classifies felons versus misdemeanants; a court is likely to
find this classification to be irrational.117 A court may also give
Exile, supra note 17, at 160 (discussing the applicability of Article 25 of the ICCPR to
felon disenfranchisement laws). The United States has ratified the ICCPR.
110 See infra Part III.A.
111 See infra Part III.B.
112 See infra Part III.C.
113 Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 480 (1990).
114 Id.
115 N.Y. JUD. LAW § 500 (McKinney 2003); Oglesby v. McKinney, 788 N.Y.S.2d 559,
564 (Sup. Ct. 2004).
116 See infra Part III.A.1–3.
117 See infra notes 276–317 and accompanying text.
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heightened scrutiny to classifications based on felony-conviction
history if it concludes that individuals with such histories are a
semi-suspect class or that such classifications are the product of ani-
mus.118 The racial impact of felon jury exclusion on the composi-
tion of juries may elicit strict scrutiny from a court; if it does, the
exclusion is sure to fail.119
Finally, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
protects the judicial process from the appearance of bias.120 Felon
jury exclusion’s racial impact magnifies the appearance of a skewed
judicial system and likely violates this Due Process requirement.121
Standing will not be hard to establish for such a challenge.122
118 See infra notes 303–17 and accompanying text.
119 See infra notes 382–420 and accompanying text.
120 See infra notes 421–30 and accompanying text.
121 Felon jury exclusion may also violate the potential juror’s right to privacy recog-
nized as penumbral to the Ninth Amendment: a juror called for service who is not
eliminated at the questionnaire stage will be subject to undue public attention when
his or her past felony convictions become known during the voir dire process. See
Amanda Kutz, A Jury of One’s Peers: Virginia’s Restoration of Rights Process and Its Dispro-
portionate Effect on the African American Community, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2109,
2147–49 (2005). The Due Process Clause is also the constitutional site of the “irrebut-
table presumption doctrine,” a doctrine historically used to protect rights deemed
“important” from curtailment based on presumptions rather than individual review.
See Binnall, supra note 54, at 4, 20–30. Binnall argues that the doctrine, last applied by
the Supreme Court in Cleveland Board of Ed. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974), should be
revived. Under this doctrine, heightened scrutiny will be applied to jury exclusion, a
right whose “infringement serves to disempower.” Binnall, supra note 54, at 21.
122 The criteria for third-party standing to litigate a claim of unconstitutional dis-
crimination are (1) that the litigant must have suffered an actual injury that gives him
or her a sufficiently concrete interest in the outcome of the issue in dispute; (2) that
the litigant must have a close relation to the third party such that there will be no loss
in terms of effective advocacy by letting the litigant raise the excluded juror’s claims;
and (3) that there must exist some hindrance to the third party’s ability to protect his
or her own rights. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 411 (1991) In Powers, the Court held
that a defendant had standing to litigate the rights of excluded jurors because (1) the
litigant suffered an actual injury when discrimination in the selection of jurors cast
doubt on the integrity of the judicial process and placed the fairness of a criminal
proceeding in doubt; (2) the relationship between a litigant and jurors is sufficiently
close in light of other relationships where third-party standing has been granted and
its closeness is reinforced by common interests in eliminating discrimination from the
courtroom; and (3) suits by excluded jurors are rare and the barriers to a suit by an
excluded juror are daunting. Id. at 413–15. In Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc.,
500 U.S. 614, 628–31 (1991), the Court applied the same analysis in deciding that civil
litigants had standing to raise rights of excluded jurors, and in Georgia v. McCollum,
505 U.S. 42, 56 (1992), to grant standing to the prosecutor in a criminal case. Poten-
tial jurors themselves have standing to litigate their own right to be included in the
jury pool. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986); McCollum, 505 U.S. at 48;
Bokulich v. Jury Comm’n, 298 F. Supp. 181, 190 (N.D. Ala. 1968), aff’d, Carter v. Jury
Comm’n, 396 U.S. 320, 329 (1970). In Johnson v. Durante, 387 F. Supp. 149 (E.D.N.Y.
1975), Queens County residents excluded from the grand jury rolls at discretion of
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Courts liberally grant standing to civil litigants, criminal defend-
ants, excluded jurors, and parties to a litigation seeking third-party
standing to challenge a violation of excluded jurors’ equal protec-
tion rights.123
A. “Drawn From a Fair Cross Section of the Community”
Americans expect to find juries “of their peers” in all court-
rooms—state or federal, civil or criminal. This expectation arises
out of the “impartial jury” guaranteed by the Bill of Rights for civil
and criminal juries.124 The Sixth Amendment of the United States
Constitution guarantees all criminal defendants “the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed.”125 A jury “drawn
from a fair cross section of the community” is the Supreme Court’s
gloss on the words “impartial jury.”126 The cross-section require-
ment originated in a 1946 federal civil case Thiel v. Southern Pacific
Co.127 In Thiel, the Court held the exclusion of day laborers from
the jury pool by the jury commissioner to be a violation of the fair-
cross-section requirement; the commissioner had not been calling
commissioners on the basis of gender, occupation, locality, and race also brought a
successful challenge under the Equal Protection Clause.
123 A civil litigant or criminal defendant has standing to challenge a jury that is
constructed in a way that systematically excludes members of the group he or she
belongs to under Equal Protection, Batson, 476 U.S. at 96 (racial group), or a jury
selection process that is not designed to represent a fair-cross-section of the commu-
nity, whether or not the systematically excluded groups are groups to which he him-
self belongs. See, e.g., Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 477 (1990) (finding that a white
defendant has standing to challenge use of peremptory challenges that excluded Afri-
can American jurors as fair-cross-section violation); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522,
526 (1975) (finding that a male defendant has standing to challenge statute that re-
sults in exclusion of large portion of women from the jury pool as fair cross-section
violation). Courts freely award third-party standing to civil litigants, criminal defend-
ants, and prosecutors to challenge jury exclusions that violate Equal Protection for
the excluded jurors. See, e.g., Campbell v. Louisiana, 523 U.S. 392, 400 (1998) (hold-
ing a white defendant can raise the third-party Equal Protection claims of African
American would-be grand jurors); Powers, 499 U.S. at 415 (holding that a white defen-
dant has third-party standing to raise the Equal Protection claims of African American
petit jurors excluded through peremptory challenges by the prosecution).
124 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
125 Id. In Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), the Court applied the Sixth
Amendment to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
126 Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 480 (1990); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522,
528 (1975).
127 Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946) (“[E]very jury [need not] contain
representatives of all the economic, social, religious, racial, political and geographical
groups of the community . . . [b]ut . . . prospective jurors [must] be selected by court
officials without systematic and intentional exclusion of any of these groups.”).
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such laborers based on the belief that they would be excused for
financial hardship by the judge when they appeared to serve.128
The Court did not provide a single authority for this holding. The
same year, the Court faced a case challenging the exclusion of wo-
men from criminal juries, Ballard v. United States.129 In Ballard, the
Court quoted extensively from Thiel, and explained that the impo-
sition of the cross-section requirement was an exercise of its super-
visory power over the administration of justice in the federal
courts.130
After Thiel and Ballard, the cross-section requirement devel-
oped simultaneously in the civil and criminal contexts. In Taylor v.
Louisiana, a criminal case, the Court read it directly into the Sixth
Amendment’s requirements for a criminal trial.131 The Court ex-
plained its understanding of the requirement:
We accept the fair-cross-section requirement as fundamen-
tal to the jury trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and are
convinced that the requirement has solid foundation. The pur-
pose of a jury is to guard against the exercise of arbitrary
power—to make available the commonsense judgment of the
community as a hedge against the overzealous or mistaken pros-
ecutor and in preference to the professional or perhaps over-
conditioned or biased response of a judge. This prophylactic
vehicle is not provided if the jury pool is made up of only special
segments of the populace or if large, distinctive groups are ex-
cluded from the pool. Community participation in the adminis-
tration of the criminal law, moreover, is not only consistent with
our democratic heritage but is also critical to public confidence
in the fairness of the criminal justice system. Restricting jury ser-
vice to only special groups or excluding identifiable segments
playing major roles in the community cannot be squared with
the constitutional concept of jury trial.132
There are several popular misconceptions of the fair-cross-sec-
tion requirement. Some think that it only applies to criminal trials.
Others believe that the Court only has the authority to impose the
requirement on the federal courts. Neither is true. Fair-cross-sec-
128 Id. at 222.
129 See Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946).
130 Id. at 193. Admittedly, the Supreme Court does not have supervisory power over
New York State courts. But no authority suggests that a different constitutional stan-
dard for a properly representative jury pool under the impartial jury requirement
applies outside the federal judiciary.
131 Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530 (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Thiel,
328 U.S. at 227).
132 Id.
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tion jurisprudence principles developed under the Sixth Amend-
ment and the supervisory authority of the Supreme Court are
routinely applied to constitutional challenges of jury construction
in trials not covered by the Sixth Amendment guarantee and
outside the Court’s authority.133 The Court has contributed to the
confusion. The Taylor Court distinguished an earlier criminal case,
Hoyt, another challenge to the exclusion of women from jury pools
unless they affirmatively volunteered, because the earlier case “did
not involve a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury drawn
from a fair cross section of the community and the prospect of
depriving him of that right if women as a class are systematically
excluded.”134 But Hoyt was an Equal Protection challenge; the de-
fendant did not raise a Sixth Amendment challenge at all. Never-
theless, in 1991, the Court stated that Taylor “in effect” overruled
Hoyt,135 eliminating the suggestion that the fair-cross-section re-
quirement uniquely applies to the Sixth Amendment jury context.
Although the issue of whether a jury drawn from a fair cross
section is required in a civil trial has not been directly before the
United States Supreme Court or any New York court, other courts
that have recognized a civil litigant’s constitutional right to a jury
drawn from a fair cross section of the community analogous to the
right of a criminal defendant in state court have gone unchal-
lenged. For example, in Timmel v. Phillips, a malpractice suit, the
Fifth Circuit recognized such a right when faced with the identical
issue.136 That court also cited Thiel and Duren and explicitly stated:
[A]lthough the standard for determining whether there has
been a violation of the proper jury selection requirement was
developed in the context of criminal cases, we assume, without
deciding, that the fair cross-section requirement is similarly re-
133 See, e.g., People v. Guzman, 454 N.Y.S.2d 852, 862 (App. Div. 1982) (“We are of
the view that these principles are equally applicable to the selection of grand jurors
[in state court], since such individuals are drawn from the same pool as petit jurors,
and the same policy principles govern both.”); see also Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 502
(1972) (plurality) (finding that a violation of the fair-cross-section requirement in
criminal grand and petit jury construction exists despite supervisory power of Su-
preme Court not applying to state court, Sixth Amendment not applying to grand
juries and not yet applying to state petit juries); Roberson v. Hayti Police Dep’t, 241
F.3d 992, 996–97 (8th Cir. 2001) (suggesting that a civil litigant’s cross-section claim
in federal civil case could be viable if the evidence offered showed systematic exclu-
sion of African American people from the jury venire).
134 Taylor, 419 U.S. at 534 (citing Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961)).
135 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 n.1 (1991) (citing Taylor as “overruling in
effect” Hoyt).
136 Timmel v. Phillips,799 F.2d 1083, 1085 (5th Cir. 1986).
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quired by the Constitution in civil cases.137
Supreme Court, federal and New York cases provide strong lan-
guage in support of this conclusion. “The American tradition of
trial by jury, considered in connection with either criminal or civil
proceedings, necessarily contemplates an impartial jury drawn from a
cross section of the community.”138 If it is unfair for a criminal de-
fendant to be tried by a jury that has not been chosen from a fair
cross section of the community, it is equally unfair for the fair-
cross-section requirement to be unfulfilled in a civil trial.139 “A civil
proceeding often implicates significant rights and interests. Civil
juries, no less than their criminal counterparts, must follow the law
and act as impartial factfinders.”140
New York law explicitly requires all juries to be drawn at ran-
dom from a fair cross section of the community in the county or
other governmental subdivision wherein the court convenes: all lit-
137 Id. at 1086 n.5.
138 Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946) (emphasis added).
139 Mitchell v. Morgan, 844 F. Supp. 398, 404 (M.D. Tenn. 1994) aff’d sub. nom.
Thandiwe v. Morgan, 41 F.3d 1508 (6th Cir. 1994).
140 Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc., 500 U.S. 614, 630 (1991) (citing Thiel,
328 U.S. at 220); see also Jones v. New York City Transit Auth., 483 N.Y.S.2d 623, 625
n.2 (Civ. Ct. 1984) (challenging the denial of jury trial in a civil trial under Jones Act,
which guarantees trial by jury for injured seamen; “Although the seventh amendment
right to jury trials has not been incorporated into the fourteenth amendment, the
principles developed under the sixth amendment are logically applicable to civil tri-
als. . . . [I]f a State chooses to provide jury trials it must do so on terms that comport
with notions of due process and equal protection.”). The Constitutional Fair Cross
Section requirement for the construction of civil juries may also be located in the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., People v. Guzman, 457 N.E.2d
1143, 1146–47 (N.Y. 1983); Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 502 (1972); Mitchell, 844 F.
Supp. at 403 (finding that a civil litigant seeking damages under § 1983 for injuries
received while incarcerated has a due process right to a jury chosen from a fair cross-
section of the community). In Peters, different opinions issued by Supreme Court Jus-
tices found different grounds for holding that there had been a constitutional viola-
tion in construction of the jury pool. The opinion announcing the judgment of the
Court located the violation in the Due Process Clause: “if a State chooses, quite apart
from constitutional compulsion, to use a grand or petit jury, due process imposes
limitations on the composition of that jury.” Peters, 407 U.S. at 501. Justice Marshall’s
opinion and its due process concerns have subsequently been approvingly discussed
by Chief Justice Burger, when announcing the opinion of the Court in Hobby v. United
States, 468 U.S. 339, 343 (1984) (discussing grand jury foreman selection procedures
at issue), who quoted from it and described its reasoning that unconstitutionally dis-
criminatory jury selection procedures violate due process by creating the appearance
of institutional bias and casting “doubt on the integrity of the whole judicial process.”
Id.; see Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 526 (1975). Justice White filed an opinion
concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Brennan and Powell joined, finding a
violation of non-discriminatory jury construction protected by a federal statute “which
reflects the central concern of the Fourteenth Amendment with racial discrimina-
tion.” Peters, 407 U.S. at 507 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
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igants in New York courts have a statutory right to such a jury.141
Our notions of what a proper jury is have developed in har-
mony with our basic concepts of democracy and representative gov-
ernment.142 The opportunity for ordinary citizens to participate in
the administration of justice has long been recognized as one of
the principal justifications for retaining the jury system.143 The Su-
preme Court has characterized our society’s understanding of a
jury as “a body truly representative of the community.”144 While
striking down a jury selection system that diminished representa-
tiveness by excluding a cognizable group from jury service as un-
constitutional and “contraven[ing] . . . the very idea of a jury,” the
Supreme Court described the jury as,
‘a body truly representative of the community,’ composed of
‘the peers or equals of the person whose rights it is selected or
summoned to determine; that is, of his neighbors, fellows, asso-
ciates, persons having the same legal status in society as that
which he holds.’145
Jury service preserves the democratic element of the law, as it
guards the rights of the parties and ensures continued acceptance
of the laws by all of the people.146
The jury system postulates a conscious duty of participation
in the machinery of justice. . . . One of its greatest benefits is in
141 N.Y. JUD. LAW § 500 (McKinney 2003); Oglesby v. McKinney, 788 N.Y.S.2d 559,
564 (Sup. Ct. 2004); People v. Guzman, 454 N.Y.S.2d 852, 860–62 (App. Div. 1982),
aff’d, 457 N.E.2d 1143 (N.Y. 1983). The New York Constitution also guarantees the
right to a trial by jury “in all cases in which it has heretofore been guaranteed for-
ever.” N.Y. CONST. art. I § 2. The word “heretofore” had to be taken as meaning
“before 1846.” Cf. Moot v. Moot, 108 N.E. 424, 425 (N.Y. 1915) (“The measure of the
right of trial by jury preserved by the state Constitution (article 1, § 2) in actions for
divorce is the right to a jury trial in such cases as it existed at the time of the adoption
of the Constitution of 1846.”); Blum v. Fresh Grown Preserve Corp., 54 N.E.2d 809,
810 (N.Y. 1944) (quoting Moot, 108 N.E. at 425).
142 See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 526–27 (1975). Cf. Berghuis v. Smith, ___
U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 1382, 1396 (2010). The democratic process may be approaching a
crossroads. In a recent concurrence, Justice Clarence Thomas pointed out that “his-
torically, juries did not include a sampling of persons from all levels of society or even
from both sexes,” as a reason why the fair-cross-section requirement should not be
read into the Constitution.  He did not, however, point out other historically accept-
able practices—a legalized slave trade, no franchise for women, strict limits on prop-
erty ownership—that might provide a reason why the requirement is needed. Thomas
concluded his opinion by saying that “in an appropriate case, [he] would be willing to
reconsider our precedents articulating the ‘fair cross section’ requirement.” Id.
143 Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 406 (1991).
144 Taylor, 419 U.S. at 526–27.
145 Carter v. Jury Comm’n, 396 U.S. 320, 330 (1970) (quoting Smith v. Texas, 311
U.S. 128, 130 (1940); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 304 (1879)).
146 Powers, 499 U.S. at 407.
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the security it gives the people that they, as jurors actual or possi-
ble, being part of the judicial system of the country, can prevent
its arbitrary use or abuse.147
It “affords ordinary citizens a valuable opportunity to participate in
a process of government, an experience fostering, one hopes, a re-
spect for law.”148 With the exception of voting, for most citizens the
honor and privilege of jury duty is their most significant opportu-
nity to participate in the democratic process.149
Once a state chooses to provide grand and petit juries,
whether or not constitutionally required to do so,150 it must hew to
federal constitutional criteria in ensuring that the jury selection is
free of bias.151 It is a crucial component of a jury of any size to
forbid arbitrary exclusions of a particular class from the jury
rolls.152 Successful challenges to discrimination effectuated by a
well-meaning statute that results in reduced representation of a
group in the jury pool are the hallmark of cross-section doctrine.
In Taylor v. Louisiana, the Court declared unconstitutional under
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments a jury selection scheme
that only included women in the jury pool if they affirmatively vol-
unteered.153 The policy was created out of respect for women’s
roles as mothers and homemakers, but had the effect of creating a
gross disproportionality between those from “an identifiable class
of citizens” eligible for jury service and those represented in the
venire.154 In a county that was 53% female, only 11% of those in
the “jury wheel” were women and no women were in the 175-per-
son venire from which the jury in the case was selected.155
Four years later, the Court clarified the standard for evaluat-
147 Id. at 406 (quoting Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 310 (1922)).
148 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 187 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
149 Powers, 499 U.S. at 407.
150 The Seventh Amendment of the United States Constitution only guarantees the
right to jury trials in civil cases in federal court under certain circumstances: “In Suits
at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right
of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-
examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the com-
mon law.” Thus, some civil cases are not required to be heard by a jury under the U.S.
Constitution. The Seventh Amendment has not been applied to the states. U.S.
CONST. amend. VII.
151 Carter v. Jury Comm’n, 396 U.S. 320, 330 (1970).
152 See, e.g., Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 102 (1970) (“As long as arbitrary exclu-
sions of a particular class from the jury rolls are forbidden the concern that the cross-
section will be significantly diminished if the jury is decreased in size from 12 to six
seems an unrealistic one.” (internal citation omitted)).
153 Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 524–25 (1975).
154 Id. at 524.
155 Id.
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ing whether there is a violation of the fair-cross-section require-
ment in Duren v. Missouri, a criminal case in which the defendant
successfully challenged a statutory scheme that provided for an au-
tomatic exemption of women from the jury pool upon their re-
quest, again out of respect.156 Fifty-four percent of the adults in the
county where the Duren trial took place were women but during
eight of the ten months immediately prior to the trial, only 14.5%
of the persons on the weekly venires were women.157 The all-male
jury in Duren was selected from a panel of 53, of whom five were
women.158 The Court announced the following rule:
In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-
section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the
group alleged to be excluded is a “distinctive” group in the com-
munity; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from
which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to
the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this
underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group
in the jury-selection process. . . . [O]nce the defendant has
made a prima facie showing of an infringement of his constitu-
tional right to a jury drawn from a fair cross section of the com-
munity, [the government] bears the burden of justifying this
infringement by showing attainment of a fair cross section to be
incompatible with a significant [governmental] interest.159
No matter what the source of the fair-cross-section requirement in
a particular case, courts use the Duren standard to judge
compliance.160
156 Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 360 (1979).
157 Id. at 362–63.
158 Id. at 363.
159 Id. at 364, 369. There is no need to prove discriminatory intent for a successful
cross-section challenge. Duren, 439 U.S. at 368 n.26; United States v. Jackman, 46 F.3d
1240, 1246 (2d Cir. 1995); see also Laurie Magid, Challenges to Jury Composition: Purging
the Sixth Amendment Analysis of Equal Protection Concepts, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1081,
1090–91 (1987) (stating that it is easier to show prima facie violation under Sixth
Amendment fair cross-section analysis than under Fourteenth Amendment equal pro-
tection analysis, because it is not necessary to show discriminatory intent). The New
York Court of Appeals in Guzman also explained that, in its view, standards under fair
cross-section requirements and the Equal Protection Clause differ somewhat in that
fair cross-section “distinctiveness” encompasses the broader principle that juries
should be drawn from a source fairly representative of the community, whereas equal
protection focuses upon classes which have historically been discriminatorily ex-
cluded or substantially underrepresented. People v. Guzman, 454 N.Y.S.2d 852, 861
(App. Div. 1982), aff’d, 457 N.E.2d 1143 (N.Y. 1983).
160 See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (requiring Fair Cross Section by
“constitutional concept of jury trial”; Duren standard discussed; decided on Equal Pro-
tection grounds); Mitchell v. Morgan, 844 F. Supp. 398, 403 (M.D. Tenn. 1994) (find-
ing Fair Cross Section required by Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment);
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For a challenge to be successful, the excluded group must be
“distinctive.” The distinctive group requirement has its roots in Her-
nandez v. Texas, a case challenging the exclusion of Mexican-Ameri-
cans from grand and petit juries.161 In Hernandez, the Supreme
Court held that it is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause to
try a defendant before a jury from which members of his or her
“distinct class” are excluded.162 The Court defined and limited a
“distinct class” to those groups that “required the aid of the courts”
in securing protection from local prejudice or discrimination.163
But in Duren, the Court declared that women, when they were ex-
cluded from the jury pool through an automatic exemption, were a
distinct class without any discussion of whether they historically re-
quired the aid of the courts.164 After Duren, distinctive or cogniza-
ble groups are not limited to those that have historically been the
target of prejudice or discrimination.165
In 1986, the Court explained that it deliberately has not pro-
vided a precise definition of “distinct group” for fair-cross-section
purposes.166 Instead, the Court pointed to the purposes of the
cross-section requirement, as outlined in Taylor, for guidance as to
who constitutes a distinctive group: (1) guarding against the exer-
cise of arbitrary power and ensuring that the commonsense judg-
ment of the community will act as a hedge against the overzealous
or mistaken prosecutor, (2) preserving public confidence in the
fairness of the criminal justice system, and (3) implementing our
belief that sharing in the administration of justice is a phase of civic
responsibility.167
Despite the Court’s deliberate avoidance of creating a stan-
dard, New York courts have not been so reticent. In People v. Guz-
man, the New York Court of Appeals held that a group is distinctive
if that group constitutes “a substantial and identifiable segment of
Timmel v. Phillips,799 F.2d 1083, 1085 (5th Cir. 1986) (finding Fair Cross Section
“required by the Constitution in civil cases”); Guzman, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 860–61 (noting
that a Fair Cross Section is required by section 500 of the New York Judiciary Law);
Oglesby v. McKinney, 788 N.Y.S.2d 559, 564–55 (Sup. Ct. 2004) (adhering to the same
principle of the New York Judiciary Law).
161 Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954).
162 Id. at 482.
163 Id. at 478.
164 Duren, 439 U.S. at 364.
165 See, e.g., Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 174 (1986) (holding exclusion of
jurors opposed to death penalty, or “death qualification” of jury, does not violate the
fair cross-section requirement of the Sixth Amendment).
166 Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 174.
167 Id. at 174–75.
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the community.”168 Other courts, including one New York court,
have further defined the elements needed to show that a group is
substantial and identifiable: (1) that the group is defined and lim-
ited by some clearly identifiable factor; (2) that a common thread
or basic similarity in attitude, ideas, or experience runs through
the group; and (3) that there is a community of interest among
members of the group such that the group’s interests cannot be
adequately represented if the group is excluded from the jury se-
lection process.169
Although a history of discrimination is not an element for
Duren purposes, courts do seem more likely to find that those with
such a history are a distinctive or cognizable group.170 African
Americans, Hispanics, and women have been accepted by New
168 People v. Guzman, 457 N.E.2d 1143, 1146–47 (N.Y. 1983).
169 People v. Mateo, 664 N.Y.S.2d 981, 995 (Monroe Cnty. Ct. 1997) (citing Willis v.
Kemp, 838 F.2d 1510, 1514 (11th Cir. 1988)); see also Anaya v. Hansen, 781 F.2d 1 (1st
Cir. 1986); Carle v. United States, 705 A.2d 682, 685 (D.C. 1998) (citing federal courts
applying this formulation of the distinct group test); cf. United States v. Greene, 995
F.2d 793, 797 (8th Cir. 1993) (using a different formulation to determine that per-
sons who have been charged but not convicted of a felony are not a distinctive
group). At least one court has added another requirement to the first prong of Duren:
distinctiveness should apply only to groups that “have been subjected to discrimina-
tion and prejudice within the community.” Anaya, 781 F.2d at 5. Where the “distinc-
tiveness” of less educated individuals and young adults was at issue under the Duren
test, the First Circuit reasoned that the history of discrimination and prejudice re-
quirement was necessary to distinguish the groups that matter for jury selection pur-
poses from the “literally thousands of ‘cognizable groups”’ present in society,
including “barbers, overweight persons, Red Sox fans, scoutmasters, Marine veterans,
radio amateurs, and so on, ad infinitum.” Id. at 6. That court was responding to a
concern about the explosion of claims it foresaw if groups with no such history are
held distinctive for Duren purposes. That court feared that, once a group is “distinc-
tive,” a mere showing of statistical underrepresentation of group members on the
venire in comparison to their representation in the community as a whole will make
out a prima facie violation of the Cross Section Requirement. Id. at 8. It overlooked
the third Duren element: systematic exclusion. The Anaya court minimized the im-
pact of not finding the contested groups to be distinctive by explicitly pointing out
that the Constitution provides other protections from “invidious exclusion of quali-
fied persons from jury service, whatever group they come from.” Id. at 7. The court
seems to suggest that a challenge under the Equal Protection clause would be appro-
priate any time there was evidence of intentional discrimination against any distinct
group. See Anaya, 781 F.2d at 4.
170 See Kalt, supra note 67, at 71; Donald H. Zeigler, Young Adults as a Cognizable
Group in Jury Selection, 76 MICH. L. REV. 1045, 1062 (1978) (suggesting that what moti-
vates judicial decisions about distinctiveness “may be [the courts’] confusion of the
concepts of cognizability and suspectness”); id. at 1064 (arguing that “to date, courts
have treated cognizability in much the same manner in sixth amendment and equal
protection cases”); Mitchell S. Zuklie, Rethinking the Fair Cross-Section Requirement, 84
CAL. L. REV. 101, 132–146 (1996) (describing conflation between cross-section doc-
trine and equal protection; suggesting new test for group cognizability for cross-sec-
tion purposes).
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York courts as distinctive groups for fair-cross-section purposes.171
The Supreme Court has accepted these as distinctive groups as
well.172 The Court has explained that exclusion of these groups
from jury service denies criminal defendants the “benefit of the
common-sense judgment of the community” as a protection
against arbitrary governmental power.173 Excluding potential ju-
rors “on the basis of some immutable characteristic such as race,
gender, or ethnic background” creates an “appearance of unfair-
ness” which undermines public confidence in the criminal justice
system; such an exclusion also deprives members of historically dis-
advantaged groups of their rights as citizens to participate in the
administration of justice.174 Racial discrimination has no place in
the courtroom, whether the proceeding is civil or criminal.175 As
the Court has clearly explained, “[t]o exclude racial groups from
jury service [is] at war with our basic concepts of a democratic soci-
ety and a representative government.”176
Groups without a history of disadvantage seem to have a more
tenuous relationship with distinctive status. Day laborers, whose ex-
clusion was held impermissible in Thiel in 1946, and other eco-
nomic groups may not be a distinctive group for the purposes of
modern fair-cross-section doctrine because it is too difficult to de-
lineate membership at a single moment in time177 and because the
171 People v. Guzman, 454 N.Y.S.2d 852 (App. Div. 1982) (Hispanics); People v.
Parks, 359 N.E.2d 358 (N.Y. 1976) (women); People v. Hobson, 643 N.Y.S.2d 610
(App. Div. 1996) (African Americans).
172 See, e.g., Berghuis v. Smith, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 1382 (2010); Duren v. Mis-
souri, 439 U.S. 357, 357 (1979); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 522 (1975); Her-
nandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478 (1954).
173 Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S 162, 174–75 (1986).
174 Id.
175 Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc. 500 U.S. 614, 630 (1991) (“[R]acial
discrimination in the selection of jurors ‘casts doubt on the integrity of the judicial
process.’ . . . A civil proceeding often implicates significant rights and interests. Civil
juries, no less than their criminal counterparts, must follow the law and act as impar-
tial factfinders. And, as we have observed, their verdicts, no less than those of their
criminal counterparts, become binding judgments of the court. Racial discrimination
has no place in the courtroom, whether the proceeding is civil or criminal.” (internal
citations omitted)).
176 Taylor, 419 U.S. at 527.
177 Anaya v. Hansen, 781 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1986) (distinguishing Thiel on the issue
of blue-collar workers: “Thiel . . . cannot be read as mandating that blue-collar workers
are a ‘cognizable group’ as that term was used in Duren, such that a mere showing of
statistical underrepresentation, with little more, indicates a prima facie violation of
the sixth amendment. In Thiel, there was uncontroverted evidence that wage earners
were deliberately discriminated against; ‘[b]oth the clerk of the court and the jury
commissioner testified that they deliberately and intentionally excluded from the jury
lists all persons who work for a daily wage.’”); People v. Mateo, 664 N.Y.S.2d 981, 996
2010] CHALLENGING FELON JURY EXCLUSION 345
blue-collar “community of interest” encompasses diverse occupa-
tions and varying compensation levels.178 A New York court has
held that young people, poor people, and recent migrants to a
county are not distinctive under Duren because these groups do not
share sufficiently similar specific characteristics, failing the second
element of the test.179
There are some limits on groups that are distinctive under
Duren despite their fitting either the Supreme Court’s intentionally
imprecise standard or the more exacting standard adopted by New
York courts. Groups defined solely in terms of shared attitudes that
would prevent or substantially impair members of the group from
performing one of their duties as jurors in a particular case—for
example, those who refuse to impose the death penalty in a capital
case—are not distinctive groups for cross-section purposes.180 An
attribute that is “within the individual’s control” cannot define a
distinctive group for jury-selection purposes.181
For a successful challenge to proceed, representation of the
distinctive group in the jury pool must be not “fair and reasona-
ble.” The Supreme Court has not articulated a single standard for
determining whether it is.182 The most commonly used instru-
ments for measuring the fairness and reasonableness of representa-
tion are the comparative disparity183 and absolute disparity/
absolute numbers184 tests.
(Monroe Cnty. Ct. 1997) (“The [Thiel] Court did not hold that poor people consti-
tute a distinct group within the community . . . Thiel held that discrimination against
individuals living below the poverty level in the manner in which jurors were selected
was unjustified, [not] that poor people constitute a distinctive group within the com-
munity”); United States v. McDaniels, 370 F. Supp. 298 (E.D. La. 1973), aff’d sub nom.
United States v. Goff, 509 F.2d 825 (5th Cir. 1975).
178  Anaya, 781 F.2d at 6.
179 Mateo, 664 N.Y.S.2d at 995–97 (finding that economic status and age are “flexi-
ble” statuses; poor people are not “a distinct, cognizable group since membership in
that group may shift from day to day” and members may have different “attitudes,
experiences, and ideas”; no evidence was presented to establish that recent migrants
to a county are “defined or limited by some factor, or that a common thread or simi-
larity in attitudes and ideas exist among [them], or that there is a community of
interests”).
180 Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 174 (1986) (holding that prospective jurors
who refuse to impose the death penalty are not a distinctive group).
181 Id. at 176.
182 See Berghuis v. Smith, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 1382, 1393 (2010).
183 “Comparative disparity is calculated by dividing the absolute disparity by the
population figure for a population group. It measures the diminished likelihood that
members of an underrepresented group, when compared to the population as a
whole, will be called for jury service.” Ramseur v. Beyer, 983 F.2d 1215, 1231–32 (3d
Cir. 1992).
184 See infra notes 185–89 and accompanying text.
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Courts in the Second Circuit frequently apply the “absolute
disparity/absolute numbers” test for unfair underrepresenta-
tion.185 The significant figure is the difference between the per-
centage of the population made up by a particular group and the
percentage of the jury pool. To illustrate, where a minority group is
45% of the population but represents 35% of the jury pool, this is a
10% disparity.186 In Taylor, where 53% of eligible country residents
were women but no more than 10% of the jury wheel was made up
of women, the disparity was sufficient to show unfair and unreason-
able underrepresentation.187 In Duren, 54% versus approximately
15% was sufficient.188 In Barnes, where African Americans were un-
derrepresented by approximately 2.8% and Hispanic-Americans
were underrepresented in the jury pool by approximately 2.3%, no
unfair representation was found.189
Underrepresentation must be both general and reflected in
the specific venire.190 In People v. Parks, where the court accepted
the fact that women constituted over 50% of Nassau County re-
sidents, the fact that they constituted only 33% of prospective ju-
rors was not sufficient to establish underrepresentation and meet
the Duren standard.191 In that case, the fact that five of the original
twelve prospective jurors were women and, ultimately, three wo-
men sat on the petit jury, contributed to that court’s deciding that
they were not unfairly underrepresented.192
Underrepresentation must be systematic to sustain a Duren
jury construction challenge. It is “systematic” if it is “inherent in the
particular jury-selection process utilized.”193 The underrepresenta-
tion does not need to be intentional; it is sufficient that “a large
discrepancy” between the number of eligible jurors of a particular
distinctive group in the population and the number of that group
impaneled on the venire occur “not just occasionally, but in every
weekly venire for a period of nearly a year.”194
185 See, e.g., United States v. Rioux, 97 F.3d 648, 655–56 (2d Cir. 1996); but see, e.g.,
United States v. Jackman, 46 F.3d 1240, 1247 (2d Cir. 1995) (“ [T]he absolute num-
bers approach is of questionable validity when applied to an underrepresented group
that is a small percentage of the total population.”) (citing United States v. Biaggi, 909
F.2d 662, 678 (1990)).
186 United States v. Barnes, 520 F. Supp. 2d 510, 514 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
187 Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 524 (1975).
188 Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 365–66(1979).
189 Barnes, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 515.
190 Duren, 439 U.S. at 366.
191 People v. Parks, 359 N.E.2d 358, 365 (N.Y. 1976).
192 Id.
193 Duren, 439 U.S. at 366.
194 See id.; United States v. Jackman, 46 F.3d 1240, 1246 (2d Cir. 1995).
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An exclusion that is the result of a legislative act can be “sys-
tematic.”195 Underrepresentation resulting from voluntary behav-
ior patterns “unencouraged by state action”196 does not make out
systematic exclusion.197
Where no facts are pled that demonstrate a systematic exclu-
sion, the courts defer to the intention of jury construction proce-
dures. For example, in United States v. Bullock, the defendant lost a
cross-section claim under Duren on the element of systematic exclu-
sion even though a venire of 100 potential jurors did not include
any African Americans or minority individuals.198 The defendant
did not describe the process by which the exclusion was effectuated
and the court deferred to the district’s goal of achieving balanced
juries and explicitly stated, “[t]hat the district court failed in its
attempt to achieve such balance does not detract from the court’s
demonstrably race-neutral approach to juror selection.”199
1. Excluding Individuals with Felony-Conviction Histories is
a Prima Facie Violation of the Fair-Cross-Section
Requirement
I propose that, under Duren,200 felon jury exclusion is a prima
facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement. The purposes
of the fair-cross-section doctrine laid out by the Court in Taylor are
not served by excluding those with a history of felony convictions
from the jury pool. The commonsense judgment of a community
certainly includes all members of a community, whether or not
they have had contact with the criminal justice system. This judg-
195 Jones v. New York City Transit Auth., 483 N.Y.S.2d 623, 625 n.2 (Civ. Ct. 1984).
196 People v. Taylor, 743 N.Y.S.2d 253, 264 (Sup. Ct. 2002).
197 Id. at 263–65 (finding no systematic exclusion where Hispanics were voting less,
driving less, and filing tax returns with less frequency than their fellow citizens and
jury pool lists were derived from lists of registered voters, licensed drivers and tax
payers); People v. Guzman, 454 N.Y.S.2d 852, 854–56 (App. Div. 1982), aff’d, 457
N.E.2d 1143 (N.Y. 1984) (finding no systematic exclusion where Hispanics responded
in different proportions to subpoenas and summonses for jury service and different
proportions claimed statutory exemptions); People v. Mateo, 664 N.Y.S.2d 981,
996–98 (Monroe Cnty. Ct. 1997) (finding no systematic exclusion where Hispanics
were voting less and driving less and jury pool lists were derived from lists of regis-
tered voters and licensed drivers); People v. Marrero, 487 N.Y.S.2d 853, 854 (App.
Div. 1985) (finding no systematic exclusion where jury selection took place on Jewish
holiday, thus excluding Orthodox Jews who chose to take exemption from the pool
for the holiday).
198 United States v. Bullock, 550 F.3d 247, 251–52 (2d Cir. 2008). It may have been
possible for the plaintiff to meet the fair-cross-section requirement had he pled spe-
cific facts.
199 Id.; see also United States v. Joyner, 201 F.3d 61, 75 (2d Cir. 2000).
200 Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 359 (1979).
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ment is not threatened by allowing those with such histories to be
included in the jury pool. If a particular individual does not have
the judgment needed to identify and protect against arbitrary exer-
cises of power, that person would be struck during voir dire.
Including those with conviction histories would boost public
confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice system. It would
alleviate some of the perception that blacks and whites are treated
differently by the courts by reducing some of the racial imbalance
in the jury pool.201 The justice system as a whole would likely gain
credibility because a system that does not avoid the involvement of
those who have experienced its reverberations in their own lives
seems fairer than one that avoids such individuals. When the civic
responsibility endemic to the administration of justice is shared by
those who are re-entering civil society after a conviction, the entire
society benefits from the integration that is achieved.
The Duren concept of a cognizable or distinct group encom-
passes those with conviction histories, whether characterized as a
requirement that the group be “substantial and identifiable”—in
the words of the New York Court of Appeals—or by elements
adopted by some New York courts. At least one federal circuit court
has already conceded that individuals’ contact with the criminal
justice system is sufficient to make them a distinctive group for
cross-section purposes.202
People with conviction histories fit within the more exacting
criteria articulated by New York courts for distinct or cognizable
groups under Duren. Individuals with conviction histories are cer-
tainly a “substantial and identifiable segment” of many communi-
ties, as articulated in Guzman.203 The experience of those with
conviction histories also fits well into the elements adopted by the
201 See generally supra note 47 and accompanying text (describing the perceived and
often factually disproportionate treatment of blacks and other minority groups in the
justice system, using the trial of Rodney King as backdrop).
202 United States v. Greene, 995 F.2d 793, 797 (8th Cir. 1993) (discussing persons
who have been charged with a crime but not convicted); cf. United States v. Barry, 71
F.3d 1269 (7th Cir. 1995). In Barry, the Seventh Circuit concluded that those who
have pending felony charges against them are not a distinctive group in reference to
the purposes set out in Taylor because, by running afoul of the law, accused persons
have shown poor judgment, not “the common-sense judgment of the community.”
Barry, 71 F.3d at 1273. The reasoning overlooked the basic fact that simply being
accused of a crime is not dispositive of either an individual’s past actions or intrinsic
qualities. That court also theorized that alleged felons’ exclusion, “more than their
inclusion, would be likely to preserve public confidence in the criminal justice sys-
tem.” Id. Scientific evidence of juror’s and the public confidence in the system contra-
dicts the Seventh Circuit’s theory. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
203 See, e.g., supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text.
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Mateo court;204 those with felony histories are certainly defined and
limited to this discrete factor. Felony-conviction histories are much
simpler to define than “youth” or “poverty”; one need only look at
a person’s criminal record. As enumerated, a common experience
also runs through the group of people with felony-conviction histo-
ries—that of being convicted. Conviction data in New York demon-
strate that this is not entirely within an individual’s control.205
There is also a community of interest among these people who
have had encounters with the criminal justice system, their advo-
cates, supporters, friends, and families. Although courts have held
otherwise,206 the interests cannot be adequately represented if all
individuals with criminal conviction histories were eliminated from
the jury pool; the entire community’s voice would be stifled.
The explicit limits placed on groups that can be held cogniza-
ble under Duren do not encompass those with felony-conviction his-
tories. A felony-conviction history is not an indication of an
attitude that would prevent or substantially impair competent per-
formance of the duties of a juror in a particular case.207 While be-
havior that leads to a felony conviction is probably within an
individual’s control, the conviction itself is not. Factors outside an
individual’s control that can lead to a permanent history of a fel-
ony conviction include the assignment by the legislature of certain
transgressions to the status of “felonies,” policing patterns in cer-
tain communities, and burdens on the courts that result in many
innocent defendants taking pleas to felony charges in exchange for
“time served,” or other low-impact sentences.
The second and third Duren elements are easily met. As all
persons with felony-conviction histories are disqualified and only a
204 See People v. Mateo, 664 N.Y.S.2d 981, 995 (Monroe Cnty. Ct. 1997) (the ele-
ments are race or sex, a common thread or basic similarity in attitudes, ideas, exper-
iences, or a community of interests).
205 See supra text accompanying notes 35–42; see also Bob Herbert, Watching Certain
People, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2010, at A23.
206 The California Supreme Court has addressed the effects that eliminating those
with conviction histories from the jury pool has on the voice of the community and
held that it did not have negative effects, though with spurious reasoning. See Rubio v.
Superior Court, 593 P.2d 595, 609 (Cal. 1979). There, the court held that ex-felons’
interests could be adequately represented because “several classes of persons eligible
for jury service have had similar experiences of loss of personal liberty followed by
social stigmatization.” Id. at 599. The court used the example of people who have
been confined to mental institutions that are “more like a prison than a medical facil-
ity.” Id. at 599 n.7. This case is not binding on New York courts and its reasoning is
dubious. In response to the majority’s reasoning, Judge Tobriner took issue with what
he termed “the majority’s ‘vicarious’ representation analysis.” Id. at 603 (Tobriner, J.,
dissenting).
207 United States v. Barry, 71 F.3d 1269, 1274 (7th Cir. 1995).
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few are accidentally included in the jury pool, it will not be difficult
to show that there is a “by the numbers” disparity, both generally
and in a specific venire. Individuals with felony histories are ex-
cluded by statute; that exclusion is per se systematic.208
Felony convictions are distinguishable from voluntary acts free
from encouragement by state action. Data evincing trends of ra-
cially biased policing and prosecutions, as well as the criminaliza-
tion of addiction by the War on Drugs, all point to the involuntary
nature of at least some felony convictions.209 Felony conviction nec-
essarily involves actions by the state.210 The state is involved in po-
licing communities, apprehending suspects, arresting and
charging them, creating classifications of offenders, assigning sta-
tus to those convicted, and creating collateral consequences such
as felon jury exclusion. The state has created an ever-widening
shadow of collateral consequences of conviction from which it is
nearly impossible to escape.
Felon jury exclusion is a systematic exclusion that results in
unfair and unreasonable jury pool underrepresentation of the dis-
tinctive group of persons with conviction histories. Therefore, I
propose that it is a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section
requirement that can only be sustained if New York can show that a
significant state interest, as stated in Duren, is manifestly and prima-
rily advanced by the exclusion.
2. Excluding African Americans and Hispanics is a Prima
Facie Violation of the Fair-Cross-Section
Requirement
Under Duren, I propose that felon jury exclusion is also a prima
facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement due to its sys-
tematic exclusion of African Americans and Hispanics from the
jury pool.211 For purposes of cross-section doctrine in New York
courts, African Americans and Hispanics are distinctive groups.212
A “by the numbers” analysis is likely to find that approximately
22% of African American adults are excluded from the jury pool in
208 Jones v. New York City Transit Auth., 483 N.Y.S.2d 623, 625 n.2 (Civ. Ct. 1984).
209 See supra notes 37–45 and accompanying text.
210 See Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 14 (1948) (stating that the proposition that
the action of state courts and of judicial officers in their official capacities constitutes
state action within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment is a principle which
has long been settled by past Supreme Court decisions).
211 See supra notes 159–199 and accompanying text.
212 See People v. Guzman, 454 N.Y.S.2d 852 (App. Div. 1982); People v. Parks, 359
N.E.2d 358 (N.Y. 1976); People v. Hobson, 643 N.Y.S.2d 610 (App. Div. 1996).
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New York State.213 In a case where no African Americans or His-
panics are on the jury or in the jury pool, this is likely sufficient to
establish underrepresentation. A more successful challenge will be
set in a community severely impacted by the racial imbalances of
the criminal justice system.
Data show that African Americans and Hispanics are more
often the bearers of felony-conviction histories and therefore the
blanket exclusion from the jury pool of all individuals with such
histories systematically excludes them disproportionately.214 This is
inherent in the jury selection process and should be sufficient to
make out a systematic exclusion under Duren, as long as the exclu-
sion is shown to occur “not just occasionally.”215 Under Duren, sys-
tematic underrepresentation need not be intentional to make out
a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement.216 A
neutral statute that refers to a neutral characteristic can be the un-
constitutional method for such underrepresentation. There is no
discriminatory intent requirement to make out a prima facie case
of a fair-cross-section violation.217
3. Excluding African American and Hispanic Men
African American and Hispanic men are particularly absent
from the cross section of the community that is the jury pool.218
The criminal justice system has a more profound impact on minor-
ity men than minorities in general.219 The Second Department of
the New York Appellate Division is open to considering a hybrid
race-and-gender group. It has remanded cases in which the defen-
dant alleged discriminatory preemptory challenges to African
213 See supra notes 40–47 and accompanying text.
214 See supra notes 37–42 and accompanying text.
215 Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 366 (1979).
216 Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc. 500 U.S. 614, 630 (1991) (“[R]acial
discrimination in the selection of jurors ‘casts doubt on the integrity of the judicial
process.’ . . . A civil proceeding often implicates significant rights and interests. Civil
juries, no less than their criminal counterparts, must follow the law and act as impar-
tial factfinders. And, as we have observed, their verdicts, no less than those of their
criminal counterparts, become binding judgments of the court. Racial discrimination
has no place in the courtroom, whether the proceeding is civil or criminal.”) (internal
citations omitted); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239–41 (1976).
217 Davis, 426 U.S. at 239–41.
218 See supra notes 35–42 and accompanying text (discussing the racially skewed
impacts of the criminal justice system by relaying statistics that reflect disproportion-
ately larger percentages of men—especially African American and Hispanic men—
than other classes regarding felony convictions).
219 See supra notes 35–42 and accompanying text.
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American males220 and African American females221 on the jury
panel to give the defense the opportunity to present evidence that
they are cognizable groups that warrant protection under Batson v.
Kentucky.222 A court may find that African American males or His-
panic males are a cognizable group for Duren purposes as well. Afri-
can American men and Hispanic men are limited by two distinct
factors: race and gender. They, at least superficially, share similari-
ties in attitudes, ideas and experience (just ask any marketing exec-
utive); and there is certainly a “community of interest among
members of the group such that the group’s interests cannot be
adequately represented from the jury selection process.”223 African
American or Hispanic women, who are excluded in significantly
smaller numbers, certainly represent some of the group’s inter-
ests,224 but do not share the attitudes or experiences of minority
men in American society.
“By the numbers” approximately 33% of African American
adult males are excluded from the jury pool in New York State.225
In a case where no African American or Hispanic men are on the
jury or in the jury pool, this is likely sufficient to establish
underrepresentation.
4. Justifying the Infringement: New York’s “Significant”
Interest
Once a prima facie violation of the right to a jury drawn from
220 People v. Jerome, 828 N.Y.S.2d 78, 79 (App. Div. 2006); cf. Curtis v. State, 685
So. 2d 1234, 1237 (Fla. 1997) (finding that white men are a cognizable group in the
jury venire context). But other jurisdictions have avoided the issue of whether African
American men are a distinctive group or dismissed it with little analysis. See, e.g., Carle
v. United States, 705 A.2d 682, 685 (D.C. 1998) (issue of whether African American
men are a distinctive group raised but not considered in the context of a Cross Sec-
tion Challenge to D.C.’s ten-year exclusion of convicted felons from the jury pool);
United States v. Greer, 900 F. Supp. 952, 957 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (finding that the defen-
dant identified “no authority that African American males, or any other group de-
fined along race and gender lines, is a Duren distinctive group”).
221 People v. Garcia, 636 N.Y.S.2d 370, 372 (App. Div. 1995); see Jean Montoya,
“What’s So Magic[al] About Black Women?” Peremptory Challenges at the Intersection of Race
and Gender, 3 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 369, 392 –403 (1996) (arguing for the viability of
an equal protection challenge to peremptory challenges based on either intersec-
tional—both race and gender—status or on separate charges of discrimination by
race and by gender).
222  See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86–87 (1986) (The right to equal protec-
tion prohibits discriminatory preemptory challenges).
223 See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
224 See, e.g., United States v. Blair, 493 F. Supp. 398, 407 (D. Md. 1980) (“[I]t is not
clear why blacks of both sexes should not be considered in determining whether
there has been underrepresentation of a racial group under a particular jury plan.”).
225 See supra notes 40–47 and accompanying text.
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a fair cross section of the community has been established, the gov-
ernment bears the burden of justifying the infringement by show-
ing that a “significant state interest” is “manifestly and primarily
advanced by those aspects of the jury-selection process” that result
in the disproportionate exclusion of a distinctive group.226
The right to a proper jury cannot be overcome on merely ra-
tional grounds or for the purposes of administrative conve-
nience.227 The government interest must be based on something
more than a stereotype. In Taylor, where there was a prima facie
case of a violation of the fair-cross-section requirement created by a
statute that excluded all women from the jury pool unless they vol-
unteered to serve, the State claimed that differential treatment of
women was justified because women served as caretakers for their
children and that the state had an interest in protecting the role of
women in the home.228 The Court did not disagree with the valid-
ity of these assertions but nonetheless reasoned,
[i]t is untenable to suggest these days that it would be a special
hardship for each and every woman to perform jury service or that
society cannot spare any women from their present duties. This
may be the case with many, and it may be burdensome to sort
out those who should be exempted from those who should
serve. But that task is performed in the case of men, and the
administrative convenience in dealing with women as a class is
insufficient justification for diluting the quality of community
judgment represented by the jury . . . .229
Felon exclusion is normally discussed as a regulation of the
jury system, not a punishment for potential jurors.230 Felon exclu-
sion laws are aimed at protecting society from the dangers of
tainted juries.231 The specific interests usually put forward by gov-
ernments to justify felon exclusion from jury service are (1) inher-
226 Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 367 –68 (1979).
227 Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 534–35 (1975).
228 Id. at 534.
229 Id. at 534–35 (emphasis added).
230 See R.R.E. v. Glenn, 884 S.W.2d 189, 193 (Tex. App. 1994) (civil malpractice case
under Texas constitution, referring to “purity and efficiency of the jury system” as the
basis of criminal exclusion); see also Fletcher, supra note 57 (discussing the lack of
convincing justification for disenfranchisement as punishment).
231 All collateral consequences, including jury exclusion, are a legal burden consti-
tuting punishment that should only be imposed through individualized sentencing,
not by a statute, under the Bill of Attainder Clauses of the U.S. Constitution, con-
tained in Article. I, Sections 9 and 10. U.S. CONST. art. I § 9 cl. 3; U.S. CONST. art. I
§ 10, cl. 1. But in Hawker v. New York the Court held that where consequences are
regulatory in nature, they do not violate the ex post facto clause. 170 U.S. 189, 197–98
(1898).
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ent bias brought to the process by felon jurors232 and (2)
protecting juries from a lack of probity.233
At least one court has reasoned that the bias of a person with a
conviction history, if such persons are in the jury pool, stands in
the way of “having jurors who can conscientiously and properly
carry out their sworn duty to apply the law to the facts of the partic-
ular case.”234 But it is not clear whether a felon-juror’s bias will be
for or against a criminal defendant.235
Although arguably plausible in a criminal trial context, bias
hardly seems credible in the civil trial context. Felons might have
an “ax to grind” when judging a prosecutor’s case, but it is hard to
see how a felony conviction would prejudice them in a civil case.236
“[T]he existence of potential biases or prejudices of a juror with a
prior felony conviction is substantially lessened in a civil case as
opposed to a criminal case.”237 In Companioni v. Tampa,238 a Florida
appeals court held that a civil litigant was not entitled to a new trial
on account of the failure of the two jurors to disclose prior felony
convictions without a showing of actual bias or prejudice.239 That
232 Courts have struggled with articulating this justification as anything more than
“the bias justification.” In a rare instance of an explicit discussion of what the bias
justification actually is, one court inartfully stated:
[A] person who has suffered the most severe form of condemnation
that can be inflicted by the state [sic] a conviction of felony and punish-
ment therefor [sic] might well harbor a continuing resentment against
“the system” that punished him and an equally unthinking bias in favor
of the defendant on trial, who is seen as a fellow underdog caught in its
toils.
Rubio v. Superior Court, 593 P.2d 595, 600 (Cal. 1979).
233 See infra note 245–48 and accompanying text.
234 United States v. Greene, 995 F.2d 793, 797 (8th Cir. 1993).
235 See United States v. Barry, 71 F.3d 1269, 1273 (7th Cir. 1995) (“[W]e think that
there is no need to theorize about whether an accused felon is likely to be biased
against the government or, on the other hand, whether he is likely to think, from
some personal experience, that all persons charged will be likely to lie to avoid convic-
tion and so be biased against the defendant.”).
236 Kalt, supra note 67, at 168.
237 Froede v. Holland Ladder & Mfg., 207 Mich. App. 127, 133 (Mich. Ct. App.
1994) (decided before Michigan amended its law to exclude all felons from all jury
service).
238 Companioni v. Tampa, 958 So. 2d 404, 417 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
239 Other jurisdictions vary. For example, the Florida felon jury exclusion statute
reads:
No person who is under prosecution for any crime, or who has
been convicted in this state, any federal court, or any other state, terri-
tory, or country of bribery, forgery, perjury, larceny, or any other of-
fense that is a felony in this state or which if it had been committed in
this state would be a felony, unless restored to civil rights, shall be quali-
fied to serve as a juror.
FL. STAT. § 40.013(1) (2009); cf. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 510(3).
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court reasoned that a rule requiring a new trial whenever a juror
served when he or she should have been disqualified due to a fel-
ony-conviction history “would be supportable only if one could
conclude that the service of a juror with a prior felony conviction—
no matter how old the conviction or however unrelated to the mat-
ter to be tried—would deprive one or both of the parties of a fair
and impartial jury.”240 That court conceded that “many persons
with prior felony convictions undoubtedly serve on juries” in Flor-
ida,241 and dismissed the notion that the presence of a juror with a
conviction history by itself leads to a biased jury as inapplicable in
the civil context.242
The bias rationale is one of administrative convenience and
therefore insufficient to constitute a “significant state interest” that
would justify eliminating a distinct group from the jury pool. It is a
gross overgeneralization. The rest of the jury selection process is
designed to make individualized determinations of nonpartial-
ity.243 Voir dire eliminates individuals who are not fit to serve by
treating jury competence as “an individual rather than a group or
class matter.”244 Treating convictions as grounds for a challenge
“for cause” is an alternative that addresses concerns about the bias
of a particular jury while treating all potential jurors as individuals.
Under the current law, New York conflates felony-conviction his-
tory with a bias that would affect jury deliberations. This results in
the abrogation of citizens’ rights to participate in a democratic in-
stitution and threat to civil litigants’ and criminal defendants’
rights to impartial juries drawn from their communities.
The probity justification may be rational but it is not sufficient
to be a significant government interest. Courts have recognized the
government’s legitimate interest in protecting probity of juries as a
rational basis in the Equal Protection context for excluding felons
from juries in criminal trials.245 But mere rationality is not suffi-
cient to meet the Duren “significant state interest” standard.246
240  Companioni, 958 So. 2d at 413.
241 Id. at 417.
242 Id. at 413–14.
243 Kalt, supra note 67, at 102–05; Binnall, supra note 54, at 33.
244 Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946).
245 See, e.g., United States v. Arce, 997 F.2d 1123, 1127 (5th Cir. 1993) (rational
basis review of Equal Protection Clause claim of discrimination against felons);
United States v. Greene, 995 F.2d 793, 795 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v. Foxworth,
599 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1979) (holding that felon exclusion “is intended to assure the
‘probity’ of the jury” is rationally based) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 90-1076 (1968), re-
printed in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1792, 1796).
246 See supra text accompanying note 226.
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Deference to probity seems absurdly paternalistic and another
administrative justification for felon jury exclusion given the fact
that many felons are honest, many dishonest people are not felons,
and many people in the population have committed acts that are
felonies under the law but have never been caught.247 In his article
The Number They Gave Me When They Revoked My Citizenship: Perverse
Consequences of Ex-Felon Civic Exile, James M. Binnall presents the
probity justification put forward for felon jury exclusion as the
product of a belief that a felony conviction is evidence of an intrin-
sic, permanent character flaw that is a barrier to functional self-
government.248 As Binnall explains, this belief is based on at least
three untested presumptions: that a felony conviction is a clear
sign of “bad character”; that a person’s character will never change;
and that good character is necessary to have an understanding of
the public good and the ability to self-govern.249 Allowing these
presumptions to create a policy that excludes a distinctive group
from the jury pool may be rational but it is not a significant govern-
ment interest.
Recidivism is a justification sometimes proffered for keeping
all individuals with felony-conviction histories out of the jury pool
based on the theory that they are likely to continue being
criminals.250 The argument that felons should be barred from ju-
ries because they are, as a group, likely to re-offend, as Professor
Kalt points out, is incompatible with notions of due process and
the presumption of innocence.251 This concern about “criminals”
on juries is not shared by all courts. The United States District
Court for the Eastern District of New York has clearly stated that
“[e]ven if [a] juror had been engaged in criminal conduct at the
time of the voir dire, his jury service would not, of itself, have vio-
lated [the criminal defendant’s] constitutional rights to a fair and
impartial jury.”252
247 See Kalt, supra note 67, at 102–03; ANGELA Y. DAVIS, ARE PRISONS OBSOLETE? 112
(2003).
248 James M. Binnall, The Number They Gave Me When They Revoked My Citizenship:
Perverse Consequences of Ex-Felon Civic Exile, 44 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 667, 673– 74 (2008).
249 Id.
250 See Kalt, supra note 67, at 145–48.
251 Id. at 146.
252 Blount v. Keane, No. CV-91-0115, 1992 WL 210982, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 6,
1992). Some jurisdictions now impose a waiting period after the end of criminal jus-
tice supervision or the time of sentencing before the right to be selected for jury
service is restored to address concerns about allowing those who have just been re-
leased from supervision and are statistically likely to have further contact with the
criminal justice system to be included in the jury pool. See Kalt, supra note 67, at
145–48.
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The reluctance of judges to overturn verdicts reached by juries
that erroneously contain members with felony-conviction histories,
unless the appellant can show actual bias in the jury deliberations,
undermines the most common argument against felon jury exclu-
sion—that individuals with felony-conviction histories inherently
bring bias to the jury. The mere presence of a juror who has been
convicted of a felony on a New York jury does not invalidate the
proceeding or require that a new trial be held absent a showing of
fraud or prejudice.253 The Third Department has held that the fact
that a juror was, unbeknownst to him, the subject of a grand jury
investigation while serving on a criminal trial jury and had a youth-
ful offender adjudication in his past was not sufficient to require
setting aside the verdict reached by the jury on which he served on
the ground that the defendant had been denied his right to a fair
and impartial jury.254 That court found the facts insufficient to con-
stitute a violation of section 510 of the New York Judiciary Law.255
That court also noted that, even if there were sufficient facts to find
a violation, the verdict need not be set aside because the juror’s
presence, without more, was neither prejudicial under section
440.10(f) nor a violation of the defendant’s constitutional rights
under section 440.10(h) of the New York Criminal Procedure
Law.256 There do not appear to be any New York civil cases in
which litigants challenged a verdict because of the presence of a
juror who had been convicted of a felony.
A blanket felon jury exclusion only serves the interest of ad-
ministrative convenience. Such exclusions are explicitly unlawful in
the employment context absent consideration of particular guide-
lines.257 Voir dire procedures in New York currently successfully
253 People v. Mercado, 753 N.Y.S.2d 125 (App. Div. 2002) (requiring the showing of
bias due to felon jurors’ non-disclosure of his status before a new trial is granted);
People v. White, 354 N.Y.S.2d 735 (App. Div. 1974) (where grand jury foreman had
not disclosed his felony-conviction history, the court refused to overturn the verdict
without a showing of bias).
254 People v. Astle, 503 N.Y.S.2d 175, 177 (App. Div. 1986).
255 Id.
256 Id.
257 An employer must not have a blanket ban on hiring or retaining individuals
who have records of arrest or conviction. When making an adverse hiring or retention
decision based on criminal record history, guidelines issued by the U.S. Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission at the federal level require that an employer show
that there is an underlying business necessity for the decision and that it has consid-
ered (1) the nature and gravity of the offense or offenses, (2) the time that has passed
since the conviction and/or completion of the sentence; and (3) the nature of the job
held or sought. U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, Policy Statement on the Issue of
Conviction Records under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e et seq. (Feb. 4, 1987); U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, Policy Gui-
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eliminate those members of the community whose experience
leads them to a biased view of the justice system—crime victims,
police officers, lawyers, etc.—without excluding them categori-
cally.258 In the jurisdictions that allow those with felony-conviction
histories to serve on juries, voir dire also successfully eliminates
those whose specific conviction histories suggest they would be bi-
ased members of a jury.259
In his defense of disqualification for jury service based on an
exclusion that, although admittedly disproportionately excluding
African Americans, is based on a “good reason,”260 Professor Ran-
dall Kennedy ignores the role of voir dire in the jury selection pro-
cess. He writes,
[t]hose who have been charged with or convicted of committing
felonies are likely to bear a grudge against the criminal justice
system. Furthermore, in the vast majority of instances, commit-
ting a serious crime can properly be seen as a disturbing sign of
personal irresponsibility.261
This logic does not amount to a significant government interest. It
is purely conjecture and does not take into account the specific
abilities and biases of a particular potential juror. Studies of public
opinion about the jury system suggest that, due to racial impact,
excluding all those with felony-conviction histories actually does
more harm to the public’s perception of the jury system as unbi-
ased than any effect that a single individual with a felony convic-
dance on the Consideration of Arrest Records in Employment Decisions under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (Sept. 7, 1990).
Under Article 23-A of the New York State Correction Law, a criminal conviction is
only relevant if a direct relationship exists between the conviction and the prospective
job or if employment would pose an unreasonable risk to persons or property. N.Y.
CORR. LAW § 753 (McKinney 2009). An employer cannot presume a direct relation-
ship or an unreasonable risk exists; instead, it must evaluate the following factors,
among others, before reaching that conclusion: (1) New York public policy in favor of
employing people with conviction histories; (2) the necessary duties and responsibili-
ties of the job and the bearing the conviction has on the fitness and ability of the
applicant or employee to fulfill them; (3) how long ago the offense occurred, how
serious it was, and the applicant or employee’s age at that time; (4) evidence from the
applicant or employee of rehabilitation and good conduct; (5) the legitimate interest
of the employer in protecting people and property; and (6) a Certificate of Relief
from Disabilities or Certificate of Good Conduct issued either by a court or the Board
of Parole to the applicant or employee. Id. Both certificates create a legal presump-
tion that the applicant or employee is “rehabilitated” of her convictions. See N.Y.
CORR. LAW § 750 et seq. (McKinney 2009).
258 See Kalt, supra note 67, at 102–03; Binnall, supra 54, at 33.
259 See Kalt, supra note 67.
260 RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME AND THE LAW 235 (1998).
261 Id. Professor Kennedy presents a similarly stereotype-based explanation for why
the criterion of “sanity” is appropriate. Id. at 234–35.
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tion who was subject to voir dire and selected for jury service can
possibly have on its actual bias.262
Justifications for felon exclusion do not fit easily into the usual
explanations for the functioning of criminal law and therefore are
not treated with the deference usually afforded to penological in-
terests.263 Being excluded from the jury pool does not serve to re-
habilitate a convicted felon.264 Quite the opposite––it suggests that
whatever rehabilitation is accomplished during the time an individ-
ual serves for his crime is either futile or insufficient to allow him
or her to participate fully in civil society.265 The threat of jury ex-
clusion is not likely to deter a potential criminal.266 Excluding
those with conviction histories from the jury pool does nothing to
prevent future crimes.267
Simply because felon jury exclusion in New York was retained
when the rest of the jury selection process was reformed to bring it
into compliance with the fair-cross-section requirement does not
make it per se constitutional.268 The reasoning of the Court in Tay-
lor is instructive:
If at one time it could be held that . . . juries must be drawn
from a fair cross section of the community but that this require-
ment permitted the almost total exclusion of women, this is not
the case today. Communities differ at different times and places.
What is a fair cross section at one time or place is not necessarily
a fair cross section at another time or a different place.269
Since 1977, when felon jury exclusion in New York was
thought to comply with the fair-cross-section requirement, the ef-
fect of the exclusion has changed. The reach of the criminal justice
system has expanded to an unprecedented scale. Its impacts on mi-
nority communities are well known. Arguing that the exclusion
should be judged by the effects the exclusion was projected to have
in 1977 despite thirty years of data demonstrating much greater
restrictions on the jury pool than could have then been
262 See, e.g., note 47 and accompanying text.
263 See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987); Internal Exile, supra note 17, at
160–61 discussing the penological explanations for all collateral sentencing
consequences).
264 Kalt, supra note 67,at 132–33.
265 Id.
266 Id. at 135.
267 Id.
268 See Richard Re, Re-Justifying the Fair Cross Section Requirement: Equal Representation
and Enfranchisement in the American Criminal Jury, 116 YALE L.J. 1568, 1603–04 (2007).
269 Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 537 (1975).
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imagined270 is not likely to convince a court.
B. Equal Protection
If the state chooses to use juries, grand juries and the venires
for petit juries are subject to the Equal Protection Clause’s require-
ments with respect to the method of their selection.271 When dis-
criminatory selection mechanisms based on group stereotypes
rooted in and reflective of historical prejudice have the effect of
excluding group members from civil and criminal juries, they vio-
late the Equal Protection rights of those excluded.272
1. Jurors’ Right to Non-Discriminatory Jury Construction
All citizens have the right not to be excluded from grand- and
petit-jury lists on the basis of irrelevant factors such as race or em-
ployment status.273 Any group excluded from the jury pool can po-
tentially raise an Equal Protection Clause challenge to the
exclusion under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.274
270 See supra notes 29–31, 33–34, 42 and accompanying text.
271 See Cobbs v. Robinson, 528 F.2d 1331, 1334 (2d Cir. 1975) (grand juries); Bat-
son v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85–86 (1986) (petit juries).
272 Carter v. Jury Comm’n, 396 U.S. 320, 329–30 (1970); Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete Co. Inc., 500 U.S. 614, 630–31 (1991). Commentators suggest that the fun-
damental injury inflicted by discrimination in jury selection is its effect on the ex-
cluded jurors. See, e.g., Barbara Underwood, Ending Race Discrimination in Jury Selection:
Whose Right Is It Anyway? 92 COLUM. L. REV. 725 (1992); Joel H. Swift, The Unconven-
tional Equal Protection Jurisprudence of Jury Selection, 16 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 295 (1996). For
example, Barbara Underwood suggests that the primary reason for prohibiting race-
based jury selection is to bring all citizens into full and equal participation in the
institutions of American self-government. 92 COLUM. L. REV. at 727. This sentiment
echoes the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’ “participation” re-
quirement. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art 25, G.A. Res.
2200A (XXI), ¶ 21, U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 16 at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16,
1966).
273 Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 423 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Carter,
396 U.S. 320, Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946)); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S.
475, 479 (1954).
274 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see, e.g., United States v. Foxworth, 599 F.2d 1, 4
(1st Cir. 1979); Carter, 396 U.S. at 329; Johnson v. Durante, 387 F. Supp. 149, 149
(E.D.N.Y. 1975) (brought by county residents for discrimination by sex, occupation,
locality and race in creating Queens County grand jury rolls at the discretion of com-
missioners). Tanya Coke argues that in cases involving racially diverse juries this appli-
cation of Equal Protection—a race neutral doctrine—places the individual juror’s
rights above the defendant’s and the public’s interest. See Tanya Coke, Lady Justice
May Be Blind, But Is She a Soul Sister? Race Neutrality and the Ideal of Representative Juries,
69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 327, 339–48 (1994). In Georgia v. McCollom, 505 U.S. 42, 54–55
(1992), the Court held that a defense attorney’s racial use of peremptory challenges
violated the jurors’ Equal Protection rights. Coke explains that the result of this hold-
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In both Johnson and Carter, potential jurors successfully chal-
lenged the discriminatory application of neutral statutes through
the subjective judgments of individual officials, the commissioners,
and clerks charged with creating a panel of qualified jurors.275
2. Irrational Classification: Felons versus Misdemeanants
New York’s felon jury exclusion law classifies felons as disquali-
fied from inclusion in the jury pool but misdemeanants as quali-
fied.276 Potential jurors excluded from the jury pool due to felony-
conviction history may be able to successfully challenge the statute
on the grounds that it arbitrarily discriminates between similarly
situated individuals, i.e., those who have ever been convicted of a
felony versus those who have ever been convicted of a misde-
meanor. The Equal Protection Clause requires that all persons sim-
ilarly situated must be treated similarly.277 The statute will only be
sustained if the Court finds that it passes the rational-basis test, i.e.,
that the interest furthered is legitimate and the classification rea-
sonably related to that interest.278 The interests of an inclusive jury
selection system were set out by the Court in Taylor: guarding
against arbitrary power, preserving confidence in the justice sys-
tem, and sharing the civic responsibility of administering justice.279
Other states and the federal judiciary specifically cite probity and
bias as justifications for excluding those with felony-conviction his-
tories.280 A court is likely to view all these as legitimate interests.
The remaining issue is whether allowing misdemeanants to be
included in the jury pool while disqualifying those with felony con-
viction-histories is reasonably related to these interests.281 When
ing is that a defense attorney who strikes a white juror in hopes of seating a member
of a minority is impermissibly violating the jurors’ rights.
275 Carter, 396 U.S. at 329; Johnson, 387 F. Supp. at 149. These cases can be distin-
guished from a challenge to the felon jury exclusion statute in that they did not chal-
lenge a legislative act, but challenges to legislative discrimination in the jury pool are
certainly permitted. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 537 (1975); Duren v. Mis-
souri, 439 U.S. 357, 367 (1979) .
276 N.Y. JUD. LAW § 510(3) (McKinney 2003).
277 Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L.
REV. 341, 344 (1949); see Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)
(“[T]he classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some
ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legisla-
tion, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.”).
278 U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 533 (1973).
279 Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975).
280 See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
281 Courts, when faced with similar issues in the jury context, have not given this
question a thorough analysis. For example, in United States v. Arce, 997 F.2d 1123, 1127
(5th Cir. 1993), the District Court rejected the claim that federal jury exclusion “un-
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comparing two individuals who both have criminal history records,
the distinctions between a “felon” and a “misdemeanant” may be
arbitrary. A person convicted of a misdemeanor and sentenced to
364 days incarceration by the court based on the violence of his
crime cannot rationally be said to be more qualified to serve on a
jury than a person convicted of a drug-related felony and sen-
tenced to a rehabilitation program or another alternative to
incarceration.282
Even under rational-basis review, courts are skeptical of classi-
fying individuals by their felony-conviction histories alone.283 In
Smith v. Fussenich,284 the court struck down automatic disqualifica-
tion of individuals with felony histories from employment with li-
censed detective or security guard agencies on Equal Protection
grounds using rational-basis review. That court’s reasoning could
apply to New York’s felon jury exclusion statute—another auto-
matic disqualification—as well:
The critical defect in the blanket exclusionary rule here is its
overbreadth. The statute is simply not constitutionally tailored
constitutionally discriminates against convicted felons” without discussing the
grounds for the claim. In United States v. Greene, 995 F.2d 793, 795 (8th Cir. 1993), the
court dismissed a claim that federal jury exclusion for those accused of a felony was
unconstitutional under rational basis review. The following arguments were made by
the challenger: (1) “it is irrational to exclude persons who have merely been accused
of a felony when persons actually convicted of one are eligible to serve if their civil
rights have been restored”; (2) “differentiating in juror eligibility between those who
have been charged but not convicted and others who have not been charged contrib-
utes nothing toward the likelihood that jurors will be of unquestionable integrity”; (3)
“the exclusion of those who have been charged but not convicted tends to eliminate
blacks disproportionately from juror pools. (Evidence to this effect was presented in
the trial, was accepted as true by the trial court, and is evidently not seriously disputed
by the government[ ])”; and (4) “the exclusion of persons merely accused of a felony
is offensive to the presumption of innocence given to criminal defendants.” Although
the Green court’s holding does not bolster the argument that classification of felons
versus misdemeanants violates the rational relationship test under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause, its reasoning is not dispositive as to what another court will hold when
faced with this argument.
282 This reasoning echoes the concerns of the Citizens’ Crime Commission in 1940:
“What difference does it make whether he has stolen $99 worth of goods or $101. In
the first case he would be guilty only of a misdemeanor, in the second case of a fel-
ony.” Letter from the Citizens’ Crime Commission to the Honorable Herbert Leh-
man, Governor, dated Mar. 16, 1940, Bill Jacket, L. 1940, ch. 202, at 2–3. The faulty
logic exposed by the Commission seems even more so given the discretion that judges
have at sentencing. The classification of a crime as a felony sets the maximum possible
sentence at a year or more incarceration. Judges often elect to sentence offenders to
much less than the maximum sentence and often elect punishments that do not in-
clude incarceration at all such as assignment to a rehabilitation program.
283 See infra notes 309–14 and accompanying text.
284 Smith v. Fussenich, 440 F. Supp. 1077, 1079–80 (D. Conn. 1977).
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to promote the State’s interest in eliminating corruption in cer-
tain designated occupations. The legislation fails to recognize
the obvious differences in the fitness and character of those per-
sons with felony records. Felony crimes such as bigamy and in-
come tax evasion have virtually no relevance to an individual’s
performance as a private detective or security guard. In addi-
tion, the enactment makes an irrational distinction between
those convicted of felonies and those convicted of misdemean-
ors. Hence, a person is eligible for licensure even though he was
convicted of a crime (larceny, false entry, inciting to riot, and
riot) which may demonstrate his lack of fitness merely because
that crime is classified as a misdemeanor under the Connecticut
code. . . . Moreover, the statute’s across-the-board disqualifica-
tion fails to consider probable and realistic circumstances in a
felon’s life, including the likelihood of rehabilitation, age at the
time of conviction, and other mitigating circumstances related
to the nature of the crime and degree of participation.285
In Butts v. Nichols,286 the court struck down a ban on city em-
ployment of any felon, reasoning that it was “totally irrational” that
a person convicted of an irrelevant felony would lose his or her
civil employment eligibility but a person convicted of a relevant
misdemeanor would not. In Miller v. Carter, a statute that prohib-
ited some individuals with criminal convictions from obtaining
chauffeur licenses but not others violated the Equal Protection
Clause because “distinctions among those members of the class of
ex-offenders are irrational.”287
The relationship between a person’s conviction history status
in the abstract and the restriction of specific rights seems spurious
when courts delve into individual challengers’ specific convictions
and the rights that have been denied them through blanket exclu-
sions. The U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York
reversed the denial of an application to take the civil service exami-
nation because the plaintiff succeeded “in showing that there is
sufficient doubt whether such a relationship exists between the
standard of character needed for the job [he was testing for] and
his disqualification from that position on the basis of his police
record.”288 A California court of appeals reversed the denial of a
real estate license for a five-year-old conviction for distribution of a
controlled substance because “any finding that plaintiff’s convic-
285 Id. at 1080.
286 Butts v. Nichols, 381 F. Supp. 573, 581–82 (S.D. Iowa 1974).
287 Miller v. Carter, 547 F.2d 1314, 1316 (7th Cir. 1977), aff’d, 434 U.S. 356 (1978).
288 Carr v. Thompson, 384 F. Supp. 544, 548 (W.D.N.Y. 1974).
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tion was substantially related to the qualifications, functions or du-
ties of a real estate salesman or that such conviction had rendered
him unfit to engage in that profession” was absent.289 The same
court reversed the revocation of a convicted sex offender’s license
to sell cars under a statute that gave discretion to the DMV to re-
voke such a license of a person convicted of a “crime of moral tur-
pitude” because the “conviction was of insufficient connection to
the business of selling automobiles to warrant suspension or revo-
cation of a license.”290 The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the rev-
ocation of a sex offender’s driver’s license pursuant to a statutory
ban despite a “strong presumption of constitutionality” for the leg-
islative enactment because there was lack of an adequate nexus be-
tween denial of the license and government interest under Equal
Protection rational-basis review.291 All these cases are examples of
courts striking collateral consequences of conviction for lack of ad-
equate rational relationship between the restriction and the gov-
ernment’s interest. Such a relationship seems difficult to
establish.292
Blanket exclusions based on felony-conviction histories are
less likely to withstand rational-basis review than those that treat
each individual on a case-by-case basis.293 Blanket exclusions do
withstand rational-basis review where they are tailored to correct
289 Brandt v. Fox, 153 Cal. Rptr. 683, 689 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979).
290 Brewer v. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 155 Cal. Rptr. 643, 645 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979).
291 People v. Lindner, 535 N.E.2d 829, 833 (Ill. 1989).
292 If the government interests are probity and having an unbiased jury, then a lack
of reasonable relationship should emerge if felony conviction history is the cause of
exclusion from the jury pool. Unless the crime that the prospective juror has been
convicted of actually implicates his or her truthfulness, the state will have difficulty
establishing a reasonable relationship. Therefore, the exclusion might be struck down
by a court even under rational basis review. See FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(2) (“For the
purpose of attacking the character for truthfulness of a witness, evidence that the
witness was convicted of a crime shall be admitted regardless of the punishment, if it
readily can be determined that establishing the elements of the crime required proof
or admission of an act of dishonesty or false statement by the witness.”) (emphasis ad-
ded). For all other evidence of past criminal conviction, where dishonesty or false
statements were not part of the crime, the court must engage in individualized balanc-
ing to determine whether evidence of the witness’s conviction should be admissible.
See id.
293 See, e.g., Kindem v. City of Alameda, 502 F. Supp. 1108 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (striking
down a blanket, citywide ban on public employment of ex-felons); see also Miller v.
D.C. Bd. of Appeals & Review, 294 A.2d 365 (D.C. 1972) (striking down D.C. Board’s
denial of license to sell costume jewelry on public streets on basis of plaintiff’s crimi-
nal history); Hilliard v. Ferguson, 30 F.3d 649, 652 (5th Cir. 1994) (upholding an
employment policy, which required a case-by-case examination of the circumstances
of each felon’s conviction before hiring decisions were made, after an Equal Protec-
tion Clause challenge under rational basis scrutiny).
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documented problems with criminality in certain arenas294 or where
there is a clear link between the restricted right and the convic-
tion.295 The Supreme Court upheld the absolute disqualification of
felons from office in waterfront labor organizations where state
and federal legislatures had recognized “a notoriously serious situa-
tion” which needed “drastic reform” and had found “impressive if
mortifying evidence that the presence on the waterfront of ex-con-
victs was an important contributing factor to the corrupt waterfront
situation.”296 Courts have recognized a clear link between a history
of felony convictions and employment, like, for example, employ-
ment as a police officer after conviction for crimes generally,297 as
well as between an arson conviction and employment as a
firefighter.298
As a blanket ban on inclusion in the jury pool, New York’s
felon jury exclusion law is similar to other blanket bans struck
down by the courts.299 New York’s felon jury exclusion law provides
no allowance for a case-by-case examination.300 The exclusion dis-
regards the fact that the voir dire process is particularly designed to
examine potential jurors on a case-by-case basis.301 The exclusion is
not tailored to correct documented problems with criminality in
the jury pool. No evidence of corruption caused by the presence of
individuals with felony convictions in jury pools has been suggested
anywhere. There is no clear link between a felony-conviction his-
tory in the abstract and negative effects from inclusion in the jury
pool of those with such histories. There might be an attenuated
294 See De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 147 (1960).
295 See, e.g., FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 837 F.2d 1298 (5th Cir. 1988) (uphold-
ing two- and five-year exclusions against people convicted of sex or obscenity crimes
from sex-related businesses); Hill v. City of Chester, No. CIV. A. 92-4357, 1994 WL
463405 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 26, 1994) (upholding city council’s elimination of mayor’s ad-
ministrative assistant who was a rehabilitated two-time ex-offender); Hill v. Gill, 703 F.
Supp. 1034, 1037 (D.R.I. 1989) (upholding ban on employment of ex-felons as school
bus drivers).
296 De Veau, 363 U.S. at 147, 159–60.
297 See, e.g., Dixon v. McMullen, 527 F. Supp. 711, 721–22 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (up-
holding ban for convicted felons on employment as police officers); see also Upshaw v.
McNamara, 435 F.2d 1188 (1st Cir. 1970) (upholding rejection of appointment as
police officer based on felony history).
298 Carlyle v. Sitterson, 438 F. Supp. 956, 963 (D.N.C. 1975) (upholding discharge
of fireman with previous arson conviction).
299 See supra note 257; Smith v. Fussenich, 440 F. Supp. 1077, 1079–80 (D. Conn.
1977); Butts v. Nichols, 381 F. Supp. 573, 581–82 (S.D. Iowa 1974); Miller v. Carter,
547 F.2d 1314, 1316 (7th Cir. 1977), aff’d, 434 U.S. 356 (1978).
300 See N.Y. JUD. LAW § 510(3) (McKinney 2003).
301 See supra notes 258–59 and accompanying text.
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link between a felony conviction and service on a criminal jury,302
but when the civil jury pool is considered, the link appears to be
severed. There is no reasonable connection between an experience
with the criminal justice system and a tendency to be biased toward
one side or the other in a civil case.
Animus toward a particular group is not a legitimate state in-
terest, and classifications based on animus are not treated with def-
erence under Equal Protection doctrine.303 In City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center, the Court invalidated a zoning restriction
that required a group home for the mentally retarded to obtain a
special permit, reasoning that the restriction was based on stereo-
types of people with mental retardation and paternalism toward
the group, characterized by Justice Marshall as “a bare desire to
treat the retarded as outsiders, pariahs who do not belong in the
community.”304 To show that it had a legitimate reason for enforc-
ing the regulation, the city council in Cleburne pointed to the “neg-
ative attitude” and “fears” of other residents of the community
regarding people with mental retardation.305 The Court plainly
stated that such “vague, undifferentiated fears” were not a permissi-
ble basis for the regulation.306
Jury-pool qualifications based upon classifying those with and
without conviction histories warrant a standard of review higher
than deferential rational basis because of the animus inherent in
the classification itself. An analogy to Cleburne reveals that felon
jury exclusion is based on animus alone: stereotypes of people with
felony-conviction histories and paternalism toward the group un-
derlie justifications for the exclusion, and there is a bare desire by
lawmakers to treat those with conviction histories as outsiders—
“pariahs who do not belong in the community.”307 The probity and
bias arguments in support of felon jury exclusion are based on
“vague, undifferentiated fears,” unsubstantiated by any actual dan-
ger to the impartiality of the judicial process created by allowing
individuals with felony-conviction histories to be included in the
jury pool.308 Courts already seem to be doing a more searching
302 See supra notes 236–42 and accompanying text.
303 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 432 (1985); see also U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S.
528, 534 (1973).
304 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 432; see also id. at 473 (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment
in part and dissenting in part).
305 Id. at 448 (majority opinion).
306 Id. at 448–49.
307 Id. at 473 (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).
308 Id. at 448–49 (majority opinion) (“[M]ere negative attitudes, or fear, unsubstan-
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inquiry when classifications by felony-conviction history are chal-
lenged.309 Restrictions based on felony-conviction history are al-
ready frequently struck down by the courts as violations of equal
protection under rational-basis review, despite the supposed defer-
ence of this standard.310 Where restrictions are not struck down,
courts focus a lot of attention on the importance of the particular
government interest at stake, again in the face of the supposed def-
erence of rational-basis review.311
The animus behind the exclusion and the searching treatment
already afforded to classification by felony-conviction history by
courts nationwide suggest that at least the minimal standard of re-
tiated by factors which are properly cognizable in a [given] proceeding, are not per-
missible bases for treating [one group of individuals] differently from [another group
of individuals].”).
309 See, e.g., Lewis v. Ala. Dep’t Pub. Safety, 831 F. Supp. 824 (M.D. Ala. 1993) (strik-
ing blanket exclusion of people convicted of a misdemeanor of force, violence, or
moral turpitude from the state’s list of towing contractors as over- and under-inclusive
under rational basis review) (citing U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528
(1973); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S.
71 (1971)). Another indication that a less deferential inquiry is being done on chal-
lenges to felony-conviction classifications is found in the Alabama court’s citations to
Moreno and Weber. These are a signal that it is analyzing the exclusion of felons under
scrutiny reserved for classifications based on animus or other illegitimate government
interests. In Moreno, the Court struck down the denial of food stamp benefits for indi-
viduals living in households that included non-family members because the regula-
tion was explicitly targeted at “hippie communes” and explained that “a bare
congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legiti-
mate governmental interest.” 413 U.S. at 534 (emphasis added). In Weber, the Court
struck down the denial of workers’ compensation benefits for illegitimate children of
the deceased under rational basis, acknowledged “[t]he burdens of illegitimacy,” and
stated that “[t]he status of illegitimacy has expressed through the ages society’s con-
demnation of irresponsible liaisons beyond the bonds of marriage.” 406 U.S. at 171,
175. In Reed, decided prior to the Court’s assignment of a heightened degree of scru-
tiny to classifications based on gender, the Court struck down a mandatory preference
for fathers over mothers as administrators of a deceased child’s estate under rational
basis, stating that “[t]o give a mandatory preference to members of either sex over
members of the other, merely to accomplish the elimination of hearings on the mer-
its, is to make the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; and whatever may be said as to the
positive values of avoiding intrafamily controversy, the choice in this context may not
lawfully be mandated solely on the basis of sex.” 404 U.S. at 76–77. Note that even
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), which is often cited as applying “rational basis
with bite” scrutiny to a legislative act negatively targeting non-heterosexuals, was not
so clear in its use of precedent. Romer did not cite these or any other prior rational
basis-with-bite cases.
310 See, e.g., Smith v. Fussenich, 440 F. Supp. 1077, 1079–80 (D. Conn. 1977).
311 See, e.g., M & Z Cab Corp. v. City of Chicago, 18 F. Supp. 2d 941, 947 (N.D. Ill.
1998) (upholding revocation of taxi medallions based on felony conviction “to pro-
tect those who rely on the taxicab industry from the dangers associated with convicted
felons.”).
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view used by the Court in Cleburne should be applied to felon jury
exclusion—“rational basis with bite”-level scrutiny.312 Under this
standard of judicial oversight, “simply discerning any regulatory
reason, however plausible, will not serve to satisfy the rational-basis
requirement. The relevant inquiry should more properly focus
upon whether the means utilized to carry out a regulatory purpose
substantially furthers that end.”313 This standard is an elevated level
of scrutiny through which courts invalidate state actions that ap-
pear “to rest on an irrational prejudice,”314 or are drawn “for the
purpose of disadvantaging the group burdened by the law.”315
Laws that discriminate against those with felony-conviction his-
tories may fall into one or the other impermissible category or
straddle both. They are based on fears of threatening probity and
bringing bias to the courtroom. They are also part of a constella-
tion of collateral consequences of conviction that may be imposed
as a lifelong punishment for once having strayed from the bounda-
ries for behavior defined by law.316 Felon jury exclusion, given the
lack of empirical evidence for the oft-proffered justifications, cer-
tainly seems to rest on an irrational prejudice, even if it does not
disadvantage those disqualified from jury service.317
This heightened scrutiny is sufficient to support a court’s hold-
ing that excluding all those with felony-conviction histories from
the jury pool is not reasonably related to a legitimate state interest.
Like the cases cited above, a court will likely recognize that probity
and lack of bias in the jury are legitimate interests but struggle with
312 See Miriam J. Aukerman, The Somewhat Suspect Class: Towards a Constitutional
Framework for Evaluating Occupational Restrictions Affecting People with Criminal Records, 7
J.L. SOC’Y 18, 66–69 (2005) (discussing the similarities between treatment of people
with disabilities (as discussed by the Court in Cleburne), homosexuals (as discussed by
the Court in Romer), and people with criminal history records).
313 Lewis v. Ala. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 831 F. Supp. 824, 826 (M.D. Ala. 1993).
314 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985).
315 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996).
316 Internal Exile, supra note 17, at 154.
317 It is important to acknowledge that some individuals are more than happy to be
excused or even permanently disqualified from jury service, never again receiving a
summons or actually showing up for jury duty, although this individual sentiment is at
cross-purposes with the development of the civic life of the nation. See, e.g., Ludmilla
Lelis, Many Who Get Jury Duty Call Don’t Always Heed It, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Apr. 20,
2009, at B1 (“Trial by jury is a civil right guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution, making
jury service a civic duty.”); see also Nathan Koppel, Excuse Me, Your Honor, the Dog Ate
My Civic Duty, WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 2008, at A22 (stating, “a whopping 32% of people
[polled] said that when they were called for jury duty, they didn’t bother to attend,”
and that “[t]hose who do grace the courthouse steps still often wiggle out of their
civic duty.”).
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the reasonable relationship between these interests and a blanket
felon jury exclusion.
3. Heightened Scrutiny for “Felons”
The third paragraph of footnote four in United States v.
Carolene Products Co. proposed that “prejudice against discrete and
insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously
to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be
relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a corre-
spondingly more searching judicial inquiry.”318 The Court has held
that this footnote means that when applying Equal Protection anal-
ysis, strict scrutiny of a legislative classification is required when the
statute operates to the particular disadvantage of a suspect class.319
“Legislation predicated on such prejudice is easily recognized as
incompatible with the constitutional understanding that each per-
son is to be judged individually and is entitled to equal justice
under the law.”320
A suspect class is one with a preponderance of the following
characteristics: a history of discrimination against class members;321
political powerlessness of the class;322 immutability of the charac-
teristic for individual class members;323 irrelevance of the charac-
teristic to legitimate state objectives;324 discreteness;325 and
coherence of the class. The Court has also identified some classes
that are “quasi-suspect” and therefore warrant scrutiny at a level
between rational basis and the strict scrutiny applied to suspect
classes.326
It is settled that all classifications established by the states
based on race and ancestry, as well as classifications by national
origin, are suspect for Equal Protection Clause purposes.327 The
318 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
319 See, e.g., Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 290–91
(1978); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 346 (1987) (“[R]acial discrimination is
fundamentally at odds with our constitutional guarantee of equal protection.”).
320 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 n.14 (1982).
321 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
322 Id.
323 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 220.
324 Id. at 217–18.
325 Id. at 230.
326 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 437–38 (1985).
327 Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505–07 (2005) (illustrating that racial classi-
fications receive strict scrutiny even in penological context); Hirabayashi v. United
States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943) (“Distinctions between citizens solely because of their
ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are
founded upon the doctrine of equality.”).
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Court has also created an intermediate tier of scrutiny for quasi-
suspect classes that have some, but not all, of the characteristics
above; classifications based on gender and legitimacy fall into the
intermediate tier.328 The visibility of a characteristic can play a role
in determining what specific level of scrutiny applies because
where the characteristic does not “carry an obvious badge,” the
likelihood of discrimination decreases.329
The Court has not held that ex-felons constitute a suspect or
quasi-suspect class under equal protection doctrine but its silence
does not preclude a lower court from using an elevated level of
scrutiny to examine a classification by conviction status. Richardson
v. Ramirez,330 a challenge to disenfranchisement of those with con-
viction histories, is the Supreme Court case courts cite when they
apply rational basis to legislative acts that classify individuals by fel-
ony-conviction-history status.331 But Richardson is not a bar to hold-
ing that a classification by felon status is at least quasi-suspect.332
Richardson’s holding was based on the conclusion that disen-
franchisement of individuals with conviction histories was constitu-
tional under Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment and did not
conflict with Equal Protection doctrine.333 Section 2 creates a rep-
resentational penalty for states that disenfranchise otherwise eligi-
ble voters by reducing their representation in the House of
Representatives by the proportion of excluded to non-excluded
voters but explicitly makes an exception for states’ exclusion of
persons convicted of “rebellion, or other crime.”334 In Richardson,
the Court simply did not analyze whether those with conviction his-
tories had the required characteristics to warrant heightened scru-
tiny as a class.
Whether or not they cite to Richardson, courts give little analy-
sis of the appropriate level of scrutiny to use in deciding whether to
uphold or strike down legislative acts that affect those with convic-
tion histories. In Miller v. Carter, the district court held that a stat-
ute that prohibited some individuals with criminal convictions
328 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (classifications based on gen-
der); Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (classifications based on illegitimacy).
329 See Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 506 (1976) (holding that because a child’s
legitimacy is not immediately apparent, only intermediate scrutiny is required for laws
that discriminate based on one’s parents’ marital status).
330 Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974).
331 See, e.g., United States v. Foxworth, 599 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1979).
332 See Richardson, 418 U.S. at 78. For a detailed discussion of felony-conviction his-
tory as a class for Equal Protection purposes, see Aukerman, supra note 312, at 52–69.
333 Richardson, 418 U.S. at 54.
334 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
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from obtaining chauffeur licenses but not others violated the Equal
Protection Clause, but the court did not address whether a level of
scrutiny higher than rational-basis review was appropriate.335 In his
concurring opinion, Justice Campbell noted that people with fel-
ony-conviction histories have the attributes of a suspect class but
decided that, in light of the Supreme Court’s reluctance to expand
the number of suspect classes, they did not constitute one.336
Other courts have upheld and struck down statutes that classify by
felony-conviction-history status through a rational-basis review ei-
ther with no analysis of whether such a classification warrants ele-
vated scrutiny or with a conclusory statement in place of analysis.337
This lack of analysis is the norm in cases where the federal jury
exclusion law was challenged under Equal Protection.338
335 Miller v. Carter, 547 F.2d 1314, 1316 (7th Cir. 1977), aff’d, 434 U.S. 356 (1978)
(per curiam).
336 Id. at 1321 (Campbell, J., concurring).
337 See, e.g., Furst v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 631 F. Supp. 1331, 1336–37 (E.D.N.Y.
1986) (“[E]x-felons do not constitute a suspect class”); Baer v. City of Wauwatosa, 716
F.2d 1117, 1125 (7th Cir. 1983) (“[F]elons are not yet a protected class under the
Fourteenth Amendment”); Upshaw v. McNamara, 435 F.2d 1188, 1190 (1st Cir. 1970)
(“[A] classification based on criminal record is not a suspect classification”); Kindem
v. City of Alameda, 502 F. Supp. 1108, 1111 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (“[E]x-felons are not
thought to constitute a suspect class”); Hill v. Gill, 703 F. Supp. 1034, 1037 (D.R.I.
1989) (“it is clear that the class in question (i.e. persons convicted of felonies) is not a
protected one”); Darks v. City of Cincinnati, 745 F.2d 1040, 1042 (6th Cir. 1984)
(“The parties agree that the constitutional validity of this classification must be mea-
sured by the rational basis test.”). Courts also apply rational basis scrutiny to classifica-
tions by felony-conviction history in the penological context without analysis. In
Champion v. Artuz, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals applied rational basis review
in affirming the denial of a conjugal visit by a person with a conviction history. 76 F.3d
483, 486 (2d Cir. 1996). Without discussion or citation, the Court of Appeals stated
that her status did not place her in a suspect class. Id. It decided the case on the
question of rationality and gave deference to the penological context. Id. One year
before the Richardson decision, the United States District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York also applied rational basis in the penological context when it held
that differing standards for computation of good-behavior time for felons and misde-
meanants were constitutional. Jeffery v. Malcolm, 353 F. Supp. 395, 398 (S.D.N.Y.
1973). That court reasoned that more relaxed standards for felons, who are serving
longer sentences, were reasonable because they provide incentive for prisoners’ coop-
eration with prison authorities for those who will be incarcerated for the longest pe-
riod of time. Id. (“[T]he [s]tate may well have determined that the incentive need be
greater where the sentence is longer.”). Cases decided in the penological context are
not instructive of the level of analysis required in any other context because state
actions in the penological context generally receive greater deference from the
courts. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
338 See, e.g., United States v. Arce, 997 F.2d 1123, 1127 (5th Cir. 1993)
(“[E]xcluding convicted felons from jury service does not violate the constitutional
guarantee of equal protection. The government has a legitimate interest in protecting
the probity of juries. Excluding convicted felons from jury service is rationally related
to achieving that purpose.”); United States v. Greene, 995 F.2d 793, 795 (8th Cir.
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Individuals with conviction histories are not likely to meet the
standard set by Carolene Products and its progeny for being a suspect
class, but enough of the attributes of “suspectness” may be present
to add felony-conviction history to the short list of classifications
that are treated as quasi-suspect and subject to intermediate judi-
cial scrutiny.339 As discussed, there is a history of discrimination
against those with felony-conviction histories; felon jury exclusion
and other regulations that restrict the rights of those with convic-
tion histories can be seen as part of this pattern and history.340 Sig-
nificant societal disabilities derive solely from the fact that a person
has a criminal record.341 Those with conviction histories are politi-
cally powerless—in many jurisdictions they cannot vote.342 A fel-
ony-conviction history, once obtained, is an immutable
characteristic in that it cannot be changed, as few states provide a
mechanism for expungement.343 Felon jury exclusion may reflect a
tendency to continue punishing individuals after they have com-
pleted their court-imposed sentences and be further evidence of
continued discrimination.344 Individuals with felony-conviction his-
tories make up a discrete and coherent class. In the information
age, a felony-conviction history is a highly visible characteristic, sug-
gesting that a higher level of scrutiny is needed because discrimina-
tion based on the characteristic is more likely.
1993) (“[E]xclusion from juror eligibility of persons charged with a felony is ration-
ally related to the legitimate governmental purpose of guaranteeing the probity of
jurors”); United States v. Foxworth, 599 F.2d 1, 4 (1979) (finding that the federal
exclusion “is rationally based, and hence is not unconstitutional”).
339 For a thorough discussion of the Carolene factors as they relate to those with
conviction histories, see Aukerman, supra note 312, at 52–69; see generally Ben Geiger,
The Case for Treating Ex-Offenders as a Suspect Class, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1191 (2006).
340 See also Internal Exile, supra note 17.
341 Miller v. Carter, 547 F.2d 1314, 1321 (7th Cir. 1977) (Campbell, J., concurring).
342 See OFFICE OF THE PARDON ATTORNEY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL DISABILITIES
OF CONVICTED FELONS: A STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY, app. B (Oct. 1996), available at
www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/pr/195110.pdf.
343 A felony conviction is immutable only in that it can usually not be altered, but
not in the sense that it is an “accident of birth.” See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677, 686 (1973). This formulation of immutability is important to the analysis of sus-
pectness. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 218 n.14 (1982) (“Legislation imposing spe-
cial disabilities upon groups disfavored by virtue of circumstances beyond their
control suggests the kind of ‘class or caste’ treatment that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was designed to abolish.”). One could argue that policing practices and the
proclivities of the criminal justice system have turned the fact of living in a “high-
crime” urban area into an “accident of birth.” A successful argument would weigh in
favor of felony-conviction history being a suspect classification. One weakness in this
argument is the reasoning in Plyler, dismissing undocumented persons as a suspect
class because “entry into the class is itself a crime.” Id. at 219 n.19 (referring to cross-
ing the border without authorization).
344 Demleitner, supra note 21.
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There is no larger purpose served by maintaining a low level of
judicial scrutiny for legislative acts that affect those with conviction
histories as a group. In Cleburne, the Court reasoned that the lati-
tude legislators require to create good policy for treating “the large
and amorphous class” of the mentally retarded, which is a “a diffi-
cult and often a technical matter, very much a task for legislators
guided by qualified professionals and not by the perhaps ill-in-
formed opinions of the judiciary,” prevented the classification of
the mentally retarded as a quasi-suspect class.345 Such a classifica-
tion would trigger heightened scrutiny and interfere with the diffi-
cult work of these professionals.346 Upon completing a sentence,
an individual with a conviction history need not be “provided for”
in the same way that an individual with a “mental retardation”
might.347 No similar deference to the work of professionals needs
to be given when the group at issue is individuals who have served
their sentences and become reintegrated into society. By design,
such individuals should be treated as regular citizens once their
punishments are complete. In addition, judges, while not generally
qualified professionals in the mental health field, are undoubtedly
more qualified as a group to answer difficult questions in the field
of criminal justice.
If a court concludes that individuals with felony-conviction his-
tories are a quasi-suspect class, New York’s felon jury exclusion stat-
ute will need to meet an intermediate standard of review—the state
must show that the law is substantially related to a sufficiently im-
portant government interest.348 While jury-pool purity is arguably
an important interest, felon exclusion is not likely substantially re-
lated to this interest in light of other tools already available to in-
sure an impartial jury, such as voir dire, challenges for cause, and
peremptory challenges available to both sides.
4. Strict Scrutiny for a Fundamental Right
Where legislative classifications of individuals into groups lead
to the infringement of a group’s fundamental rights, the courts
apply strict scrutiny to determine whether the legislative act is con-
stitutional under the Equal Protection Clause.349 If a court deter-
345 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 442–43 (1985).
346 See id.
347 See id. at 442 (“[I]t is undeniable . . . that those who are mentally retarded have a
reduced ability to cope with and function in the everyday world. . . . [Some of them]
must be constantly cared for.”).
348 Id. at 441.
349 See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
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mines that being included in a jury pool is a fundamental right, a
law that infringes on that right for those classified as having been
convicted of a felony but not for others will be subject to strict scru-
tiny.350 A court is unlikely to hold the law constitutional under this
standard because strict-scrutiny review is difficult to satisfy. If the
court determines that inclusion in the jury pool is not a fundamen-
tal right, the law will be subject to rational-basis review and is likely
to stand because the standard is so easy to satisfy. It is possible,
though not nearly certain, that a court will conclude that the right
to have a chance to serve on a jury is fundamental.351
While an individual’s right to serve on a particular jury is lim-
ited because he or she can be struck from serving on a jury once
included in the venire, having a fair chance at jury service through
inclusion in the jury pool approaches being a fundamental right
whose infringement must trigger the most exacting scrutiny.
The Court has called jury service “a right, a privilege, or a
duty,”352 one of the “basic rights of citizenship,”353 a significant op-
portunity to participate in civic life,”354 and an implied constitu-
tional right derived from “a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to
a jury drawn from a fair cross section of the community.”355 It has
not yet directly addressed the issue of whether the right to be in-
cluded in a jury pool is fundamental.
Fundamental rights protected by the Due Process Clauses of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments include explicit rights pre-
sent in the text of the Constitution and implicit rights not present
in the text but nonetheless fundamental.356 The Supreme Court
has held that “fundamental rights” include such rights implicitly
protected by the Constitution as the right to privacy357 and the
350 Binnall suggests that under Equal Protection analysis, heightened scrutiny will
apply if the court concludes that it classifies and infringes on a right that is “impor-
tant.” See Binnall, supra note 54, at 20–21 (citing LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW §§ 16–34 (2d ed. 1988)).
351 The Supreme Court is generally reluctant to find the existence of new funda-
mental rights, “indicat[ing] that it must ‘exercise the utmost care whenever [it is]
asked to break new ground’ to establish a fundamental right not previously recog-
nized.” Anna K. Schall, The United States Military’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” Policy: The
Aftermath of Lawrence, 19 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 341, 352 (2010) (citing Lofton v. Sec’y
of the Dep’t of Children and Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 816 (11th Cir. 2004) (quot-
ing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997))).
352 Carter v. Jury Comm’n of Greene Cnty., 396 U.S. 320, 330 (1970).
353 Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 176 (1986).
354 Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 409 (1991).
355 Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 534 (1975).
356 See U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 3; see also id. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 3.
357 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965).
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right to travel interstate.358 The right to vote has been described as
fundamental.359 To determine whether an implicit right is funda-
mental, a court uses the Glucksberg-Palko standard: it looks to the
history and traditions of the nation to determine if the asserted
right is objectively “so rooted in the traditions and conscience of
our people as to be ranked as fundamental,”360 and “implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice
would exist if [it] were sacrificed.”361
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin is
the only court that has addressed the question of whether the right
to an opportunity to be a juror is fundamental under Glucksberg-
Palko.362 That court found historical support for the existence of
juries but not for an individual’s right to have the opportunity to
serve.363 It attributed its reluctance to find jury service as a funda-
mental right to the Supreme Court’s warning in Glucksberg:
[W]e have always been reluctant to expand the concept of [fun-
damental rights] because guideposts for responsible decision-
making in this unchartered area are scarce and open-ended. By
extending constitutional protection to an asserted right or lib-
erty interest, we, to a great extent, place the matter outside the
arena of public debate and legislative action. We must therefore
exercise the utmost care whenever we are asked to break new
ground in this field, lest the liberty protected by the [Fifth
Amendment] be subtly transformed into the policy preferences
of the members of this Court.364
The caution expressed by the Glucksberg Court may be a diffi-
cult bar to overcome, but courts should bear in mind that the Con-
stitution explicitly references juries,365 whereas the right in
Glucksberg—the right to physician-assisted suicide—was located
only in the “penumbra” of implicit rights flowing from the Bill of
Rights.366
358 See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629–30 (1969).
359 See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964) (“The right to vote freely for the
candidate of one’s choice is of the essence of democratic society . . . .”); Harper v. Va.
State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966); see also Karlan, supra note 17, at 1152.
360 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 –21 (1997) (quoting Palko v. Con-
necticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325–26 (1937)).
361 Id. at 721.
362 See United States v. Conant, 116 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1022 (E.D. Wis. 2000).
363 Id.
364 Id. (internal quotations omitted).
365 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; id. amends. VI, VII.
366 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719–20 (1997) (outlining the
breadth of guarantees provided and liberties protected by the Due Process Clause);
see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (“[S]pecific guarantees in
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A fundamental right need not be an absolute right to warrant
strict scrutiny when it is limited by the actions of a legislature.367
Despite the fact that, in Carter, the Court explicitly gave the states
the right to prescribe qualifications for serving on a jury that elimi-
nate individuals from the pool,368 and despite a long history of ju-
ror qualifications that excluded residents of certain geographical
areas,369 an individual’s right to be in the jury pool may nonethe-
less be “fundamental.” The fundamental rights to traveling across
state lines,370 voting,371 and privacy372 all give way to regulation that
serves compelling government interests. In light of the importance
of juries to the American justice system, it may be possible—espe-
cially given empirical evidence of the effect on the public’s percep-
tion of an apparently non-inclusive system’s fairness373—to
convince a court that the requirements of ordered liberty and the
mandates of history374 must lead to the conclusion that inclusion in
a jury pool is a fundamental right of citizens in America’s
democracy.
If a court concludes that the right to be included in a jury pool
is fundamental, it will apply strict scrutiny when confronted with an
Equal Protection challenge to New York’s felon jury exclusion law
to determine whether it is constitutional.375 Felon jury exclusion
the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that
help give them life and substance.”).
367 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (“The privacy right . . . cannot be
said to be absolute.”).
368 “The States remain free to confine the selection to citizens, to persons meeting
specified qualifications of age and educational attainment, and to those possessing
good intelligence, sound judgment, and fair character. ‘Our duty to protect the fed-
eral constitutional rights of all does not mean we must or should impose on states our
conception of the proper source of jury lists, so long as the source reasonably reflects
a cross-section of the population suitable in character and intelligence for that civic
duty.’” Carter v. Jury Comm’n of Greene Cnty., 396 U.S. 320, 332–33 (1970) (internal
citations omitted).
369 See United States v. Conant, 116 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1022 (E.D. Wis. 2000).
370 See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634–38 (1969) (discussing residence
requirement for welfare-benefit eligibility, implicating right to travel across state
lines).
371 See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 41–56 (1974) (discussing restrictions on
felons’ right to vote).
372 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965) (discussing restriction
on contraceptive use in regards to right of privacy).
373 See supra text accompanying note 47.
374 See supra notes 62–63 and accompanying text.
375 See Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict
Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 801, 803 (2006) (stating that the
Supreme Court applies strict scrutiny to cases involving Equal Protection claims based
on violations of fundamental rights).
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facially classifies individuals based on whether or not they have fel-
ony-conviction histories. The “suspect,” “quasi-suspect,” or “non-
suspect” nature of this classification is not relevant to an Equal Pro-
tection analysis where a fundamental right is limited for individuals
in one group but not those in another.376 The state will need to
show that the law is narrowly tailored to a compelling government in-
terest, a higher standard than the “significant” interest required by
Duren.377 The probity and bias arguments usually presented in sup-
port of contested jury exclusions are not likely to withstand such
scrutiny. Even if they do, the blanket exclusion will certainly fail
the narrow tailoring requirement.378
If the court concludes that the right to be included in the jury
pool is not fundamental, New York’s jury exclusion law will need to
withstand a much more relaxed level of scrutiny: the state will need
to show that it is reasonably related to a legitimate government in-
terest.379 Preserving probity and preventing bias in juries are cer-
tainly legitimate government interests.380 The result will depend on
whether the court is convinced that excluding all felons from jury
pools is reasonably related to that interest. The irrationality of clas-
sifying felons versus misdemeanants suggests that it is not.
5. Disparate Racial Impact in Jury Selection
Racial classifications are subject to strict scrutiny under Four-
teenth Amendment Equal Protection doctrine. Felon jury exclu-
sion has a disproportionate impact by race and is likely to be
treated as a racial classification by a court. Equal protection applies
with force to protect the incidents of citizenship, of which jury ser-
vice is one.381 While in most other contexts a challenger would
376 See Leslie Friedman Goldstein, Between the Tiers: The New[est] Equal Protection and
Bush v. Gore, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 372, 373, 374 (2002); see also Skinner v. Oklahoma,
316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964).
377 See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 367–68 (1979) (requiring a significant state
interest, not merely rational grounds, to justify infringement of the “constitutional
right to a jury drawn from a fair cross section of the community”); see generally R.
Randall Kelso, Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection Clause and Related Constitu-
tional Doctrines Protecting Individual Rights: The “Base Plus Six” Model and Modern Supreme
Court Practice, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L 225 (2002).
378 See supra notes 245–53 and accompanying text.
379 See supra notes 253–62 and accompanying text.
380 See supra notes 226–69.
381 See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 622 (1969) (inval-
idating property-ownership requirement to vote in school district elections); Harper
v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966) (invalidating poll tax); Castaneda v.
Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977) (applying equal protection to grand jury service).
For a history of Equal Protection doctrine in jury selection cases, see Swift, supra note
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have to show intent in addition to impact in order to have the ex-
clusion treated as a racial classification under the Equal Protection
Clause,382 discrimination in jury selection is subject to a more re-
laxed intent requirement that can be met by a presumption based
on the magnitude of the disparity. In Washington v. Davis, the Su-
preme Court explicitly created an exception to the discriminatory
intent requirement for “cases dealing with racial discrimination in
the selection of juries” and explained that a showing of “racially
non-neutral selection procedures” would be sufficient to make out
a rebuttable prima facie case of racial discrimination.383
A year after Davis, the Supreme Court, in Castaneda v. Partida,
defended relaxing the intent requirement in jury selection cases
based on the special nature of jury discrimination. In Castaneda, a
habeas corpus petitioner alleged that his indictment by a grand
jury on which Mexican Americans were underrepresented violated
the Fourteenth Amendment.384 The Castaneda Court reaffirmed
that substantial underrepresentation of a recognizable group as a
result of a selection mechanism is sufficient to create a presump-
tion of discriminatory intent and establish a prima facie case of
discriminatory purpose.385 The Court explained the rationale be-
hind the relaxed test for intent in the jury context:
The idea behind the rule of exclusion is not at all complex. If a
disparity is sufficiently large, then it is unlikely that it is due
solely to chance or accident, and, in the absence of evidence to
the contrary, one must conclude that racial or other class-re-
lated factors entered into the selection process.386
To make out a prima facie case using this relaxed test, a defen-
272. The Equal Protection Clause also directly protects criminal defendants from be-
ing indicted by grand juries or tried by petit juries that exclude members of their own
race. See supra note 123. No precedent suggests that litigants do not have the same
right in a civil context.
382 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239–41 (1976). Showing that felon jury ex-
clusion intentionally classifies by race will be very difficult. The legislative history of
the exclusion does not evidence any such intentional discrimination. New York’s
criminalization of racial discrimination in the jury-selection context directly contra-
dicts any claim of intentional racial discrimination by New York’s legislature. See supra
notes 73–74 and accompanying text. Contrast this history with the Alabama constitu-
tion’s criminal disenfranchising provisions which were struck down by the Court in
1985 as a violation of Equal Protection because their original enactment was moti-
vated by a desire to discriminate against African Americans on account of race and
the provisions continued to have the intended discriminatory impact until they were
revoked. See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985).
383 Davis, 426 U.S. at 241.
384 Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 495–96 (1977).
385 See id. at 494, 495.
386 Id. at 494 n.13.
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dant must meet the “rule of exclusion.” The defendant must show
that a substantial underrepresentation over a significant period of
time of a “recognizable, distinct class, singled out for different
treatment under the laws, as written or as applied,” is the result of
the procedure employed to construct the jury pool.387 “[A] selec-
tion procedure that is susceptible of abuse or is not racially neutral
supports the presumption of discrimination raised by the statistical
showing,”388 but is not necessary to meet the intent requirement of
a claim of racial discrimination in the jury pool.389
Substantial underrepresentation for a significant period of
time is established statistically.390 “The goal of such an inquiry is to
determine if chance alone could account for a meager representa-
tion of minorities.”391 Where the racial disparity created by the stat-
utory exclusion of all those charged with felonies was not “gross”—
4.1% of the population was African American while 3.996% of the
jury pool was—the Seventh Circuit declined to apply heightened
scrutiny.392
But where the disparity is pronounced, the substantial under-
representation requirement is met. In Castaneda, where census sta-
tistics showed that the population of the county was 79.1%
Mexican-American, but that, over an eleven-year period, only 39%
of persons summoned for grand jury service were Mexican-Ameri-
can, the substantial underrepresentation prong of the presumptive
intent test was met.393 In Alston, the Second Circuit found substan-
tial underrepresentation where the statistically expected number of
387 See id. at 494.
388 Id.
389 See, e.g., Alston v. Manson, 791 F.2d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1986) (applying Castaneda
presumptive intent to state jury-selection scheme defined by statutes that assigned
greater representation to rural and suburban areas than urban areas with unintended
effect of decreasing representation of African Americans in jury pool; no discretion-
ary mechanism was involved in jury selection); but see Swift, supra note 272, at 315
(describing the discriminatory intent requirement as “an exercise of discretion by a
government officer coupled with a disparate impact on a disadvantaged group”). Pro-
fessor Swift articulates the requirement in this narrow way but then construes the
necessary exercise of discretion broadly, stating that, in Davis, the official who created
the test which ultimately had racially differentiated results exercised “discretion.” Id.
390 See generally Peter A. Detre, A Proposal for Measuring Underrepresentation in the Com-
position of the Jury Wheel, 103 YALE L.J. 1913 (1994) (comparing requirements articu-
lated in the case law under Equal Protection and fair-cross-section analyses, discussing
the flaws in the generally accepted “absolute disparity” analysis, and proposing a new
measure that more accurately captures fair-cross-section concerns for use in those
challenges).
391 Alston, 791 F.2d at 258.
392 United States v. Barry, 71 F.3d 1269, 1272 (7th Cir. 1995).
393 Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 495 (1977).
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African Americans in the array was 501 but actual number in light
of the geographic quota system was 368 (5.96% versus 4.38%).394
In Guzman, the fact that the probability of being in the grand jury
pool was reduced for Hispanics by 75% was sufficient.395 “[T]he
probability that the disparity had occurred by chance in a random
method of jury selection was less than one in one thousand.”396
Prior to the clear elucidation of the presumptive intent rule, the
Court in Carter affirmed declaratory relief in the form of a require-
ment that the jury commission create a new list of potential jurors
consistent with constitutional principles when excluded jurors
challenged a jury selection mechanism that resulted in only 4% of
the African American male population being included in the pool,
in contrast with 50% of the white males.397 Substantial under-
representation of African Americans and Hispanics in New York
jury pools will be easy to show statistically.398
Hispanics and African Americans are cognizable groups for
Equal Protection purposes. In Guzman, the New York Court of Ap-
peals recognized that Hispanics are a cognizable group in the ab-
stract for Equal Protection purposes, and then turned to expert
testimony that they were actually a cognizable group in the com-
munity in question.399 The same inquiry would need to be con-
ducted no matter what group’s exclusion was challenged. It will
not be difficult to establish that Hispanics or African-Americans are
a cognizable group in many New York communities.
The challenger will then need to show that the disparity actu-
ally results from the challenged jury construction mechanism.400
The challenged mechanism need not have a discretionary ele-
ment.401 In Alston, it was sufficient that a high proportion of Afri-
394 Alston, 791 F.2d at 258.
395 People v. Guzman, 457 N.E.2d 1143, 1149 (N.Y. 1983).
396 People v. Guzman, 454 N.Y.S. 852, 859 (App. Div. 1982) (discussing testimony of
expert statistician).
397 Carter v. Jury Comm’n, 396 U.S. 320, 327, 339–40; see also Whitus v. Georgia, 385
U.S. 545, 552 (1967) (African Americans were 27.1% of tax payers but only 9.1% of
jury venire); Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 359 (1970) (60% of general population,
37% of grand jury list); Sims v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 404, 407 (1967) (24.4% of tax list,
4.7% of grand jury list).
398 Although such data has not yet been compiled, representation of African Ameri-
cans and Hispanics in New York jury pools will likely be a reflection of the dispropor-
tionate engagement of African Americans and Hispanics with the criminal justice
system. See supra text accompanying notes 32–36.
399 People v. Guzman, 45 N.Y.S.2d 852, 857–58 (App. Div. 1982).
400 See supra note 389 and accompanying text.
401 Alston v. Manson, 791 F.2d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1084
(1987).
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can Americans lived in urban areas in the state and that the quota
system, which gave less representation to urban areas, could not
help but partially exclude them.402 New York’s felon jury exclusion
statute is analogous to the statutory scheme in Alston, since it too
has the effect of partially excluding African Americans and Hispan-
ics. In Alston, those excluded had chosen to live in urban areas.403
In the case of New York’s felon jury exclusion statute, the effect of
the law is to exclude individuals who have had a particular type of
contact with the criminal justice system. In both cases, a facially
neutral statute designed to regulate jury construction has a grossly
disparate racial impact by diluting participation of racial minori-
ties.404 Based on Alston’s reasoning, it is not relevant that the effect
of the felon jury exclusion statute did not originate with the exclu-
sion of felons from the jury pool but rather with the conviction of
those in the excluded population.405 This argument was not rele-
vant in Alston and should be easily dismissed in the case of felon
jury exclusion.
A challenger to New York’s felon jury exclusion statute should
be able to make out a prima facie case of presumptive discrimina-
tory intent based on the gross racial disparity created by the exclu-
sion of all those with felony-conviction histories from the jury pool
for life.406 Once a challenger establishes a prima facie case based
on the exclusion, the state may rebut the presumption of discrimi-
natory intent.407
The rebuttal must demonstrate not the mere absence of dis-
criminatory motivation but rather that “permissible racially neutral
selection criteria and procedures have produced the monochro-
matic result.”408 In Guzman, evidence that the disparity resulted
from voluntary actions by those Hispanics summoned for jury ser-
vice was a sufficient rebuttal (i.e., requesting exemptions to care
for children or due to lack of English proficiency, not replying to
402 Id.
403 See Alston v. Lopes, 621 F. Supp. 992, 995 (D. Conn. 1985), aff’d sub nom. Alston
v. Manson, 791 F.2d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1084 (1987).
404 Id. at 996 (“[T]he statute operates directly to exclude Blacks from the jury
array.”).
405 As was true of the statutory scheme in Alston—that the effect originated in Afri-
can Americans’ decisions to live in urban areas—the effect of New York’s statute simi-
larly originates in decisions made by the excluded group, specifically felons’ decisions
to break the law. See id.
406 See supra text accompanying notes 35–44; see also Bob Herbert, Watching Certain
People, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2010), at A23 (discussing the discriminatory imposition of
New York City’s stop-and-frisk policy).
407 Alston v. Manson, 791 F.2d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1986).
408 Id.
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the summons).409 The acts in Guzman all occurred after the individ-
uals were summoned for jury service and relate directly to that ser-
vice. An inadvertent computer error that excluded all residents of
particular geographic regions with the effect of disproportionately
excluding minorities was a sufficient rebuttal: the Second Circuit
distinguished the computer error from the exclusions in Alston and
Castaneda because it was a “series of mishaps and botches,” not a
“considered government policy.”410
But simply describing jury pool construction procedures in a
neutral way is insufficient. In Alston, where the state did not address
the effect of the challenged statute, which the court recognized
directly excluded African Americans, but instead argued that any
disparate treatment on the jury array is due solely to the use of
voter registration lists in selecting jurors, the rebuttal was unsuc-
cessful.411 Testimony by the state that the governing majority of the
county was of the same race as those statistically excluded from the
jury pool was also insufficient,412 as was testimony, without more,
from selection officials that they acted without a discriminatory
motive.413
New York is not likely to be able to demonstrate that permissi-
ble racially neutral selection criteria and procedures produce the
racial disparities in New York’s jury pool caused by felon jury exclu-
sion. Although there is arguably a voluntary component to acquir-
ing a felony-conviction history, it is distinguishable from the
voluntary acts in Guzman—the likelihood of contact with the crimi-
nal justice system does not apply to any person “regardless of his or
her race, sex or ethnicity,” the standard at work in Guzman.414 Hav-
ing a felony-conviction history is more like choosing where to live
(as in Alston) or the type of work to engage in (as in Thiel); where
one lives, what one does for a living, and an individual’s personal
history, including a history of felony conviction, are all rather in-
409 See People v. Guzman, 457 N.E.2d 1143, 1147 (N.Y. 1983).
410 Ricketts v. City of Hartford, 74 F.3d 1397, 1409 n.4 (2d. Cir. 1996).
411 Alston v. Lopes, 621 F. Supp. 992, 997–98 (D. Conn. 1985), aff’d sub nom Alston
v. Manson, 791 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1084 (1987).
412 Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 499 (1977).
413 Id. at 498 n.19.
414 See People v. Guzman, 457 N.E.2d 1143, 1147 (N.Y. 1983) (“The fact that a
much lower percentage of Hispanics responded to the summonses was not caused by
the system and cannot be considered an inherent defect in the process. Hispanics also
were disqualified and exempted from service in a greater percentage than non-His-
panics. The reasons—English literacy difficulties and responsibility for children—for
these actions would apply to any person regardless of his or her race, sex, or
ethnicity.”).
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trinsic characteristics of individuals. They are not responses to receiv-
ing a jury summons like the acts used to rebut the presumption of
discriminatory intent in Guzman.415 If these are “acts” at all, they
are not sufficiently voluntary to rebut the prima facie case of racial
discrimination stemming from a systematic exclusion of a racial
group from the jury pool. The state will likewise not be able to
analogize to the computer error in Ricketts—felon jury exclusion is
not a “series of mishaps and botches” but is a “considered govern-
ment policy.”416 New York’s rebuttal is likely to be insufficient.
The Court has not made clear whether an unrebutted Cas-
taneda prima facie case is the end of an Equal Protection inquiry
into systemic exclusion of a racial group from the jury pool or
whether it simply establishes the intent required for strict scrutiny
to apply.417 The Second Circuit in Alston held that an unrebutted
prima facie case of presumptive discrimination was a violation of
the Equal Protection Clause without any further analysis.418 In
Biaggi, the court followed Alston.419 If a court acknowledges a prima
facie case and the state does not present a compelling rebuttal, a
court in the Second Circuit, following Alston and Biaggi, will most
likely directly conclude that a violation of Equal Protection has
been established. A court might take an extra step and apply strict
scrutiny to New York’s felon jury exclusion statute, but the argu-
ments usually presented in support of such a statute are not likely
to withstand such an exacting inquiry.420
C. Due Process
A litigant’s due process rights under either the Fifth or the
Fourteenth Amendment are violated when there is an appearance
of bias in the courtroom.421 “[D]iscrimination in the seletion of
415 Id.
416 See supra text accompanying note 410; see also N.Y. JUD. LAW § 510 (McKinney
2003).
417 See United States v. Biaggi, 909 F.2d 662, 677 n.4 (2d Cir. 1990); see also, e.g.,
Ricketts v. Hartford, 74 F.3d 1397, 1407–08 (2d Cir. 1996) (discussing exclusion of
minority jurors in a civil case).
418 Alston v. Manson, 791 F.2d 255, 256–57 (2d Cir. 1986).
419 Biaggi, 909 F.2d at 677 n.4 (expressing reservations about the Supreme Court’s
intention for the Castaneda test on a different issue).
420 See supra Part III.A.3.
421 See Joshua M. Segal, The Satisfying “Appearance of Justice”: The Uses of Apparent Im-
propriety in Constitutional Adjudication, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2708, 2722–24 (2004) (dis-
cussing the value of perceived bias in creating an injury-in-fact for purposes of
standing required under Article III). The appearance of bias seems clearly sufficient
to make out a due process violation when the issue is the appearance of a judge’s bias.
“[T]he appearance of evenhanded justice . . . is at the core of due process.” Mayberry
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jurors ‘casts doubt on the integrity of the judicial process’ and
places the fairness of a criminal proceeding in doubt.”422 Empirical
evidence supports this assertion.423 In Peters, the appearance of bias
created by a jury constructed through an illegal discriminatory
mechanism was sufficient to make out a due process violation in
the opinion of three Justices.424 Three other Justices found other
violations sufficient to invalidate the proceedings without relying
on due process.425 Since Peters, the Court has clearly stated that the
extent of due process protections applicable to jury selection is an
open issue, at least in the context of selecting members of a grand
jury:
We need not explore the nature and extent of a defendant’s
due process rights when he alleges discriminatory selection of
grand jurors . . . That issue, to the extent it is still open based
upon our earlier precedents, should be determined on the mer-
its, assuming a court finds it necessary to reach the point.426
Although there are no New York cases where a court found a
due process violation based on an illegally constructed jury, the
District Court for the Eastern District of New York has explained
that, “[t]o make out a prima facie claim that a jury’s composition
violated a defendant’s due process rights, the defendant has the
burden of showing that the process used to select the jury pool
systematically excluded a substantial and identifiable segment of
the community.”427 It will not be difficult to demonstrate that there
is such an appearance as a result of statutory felon jury exclusion
and its racially skewed effects.
IV. CONCLUSION
New York excludes all individuals who have ever been con-
victed of a felony from its jury pool except in the most extraordi-
v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 469 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring) (addressing appear-
ance of bias by a judge). Even decisionmakers who in fact have no actual bias must be
disqualified if there might be an appearance of bias. See id. at 465 (majority opinion).
422 Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 411 (1991) (quoting Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S.
545, 556 (1979)).
423 See Austin, supra notes 47–52 and accompanying text.
424 Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 502 (1972) (plurality) (relying on due process).
425 Id. at 506–07 (Brennan, Powell, White, JJ., concurring in the judgment) (decid-
ing on grounds other than due process).
426 Campbell v. Louisiana, 523 U.S. 392, 400–01 (1998).
427 Ballard v. Walker, 772 F. Supp. 1335, 1342 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (quoting People v.
Guzman, 457 N.E.2d 1143, 1146 (N.Y. 1983), citing Peters, 407 U.S. at 503, Duren v.
Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 951 (1984)).
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nary circumstances.428 This practice undermines the representa-
tiveness of juries, their inclusiveness, and public confidence in the
courts. It also compromises individual constitutional rights. Despite
the inclusion of those with felony-conviction histories in the jury
pools of nearly half of U.S. jurisdictions, the effectiveness of those
judicial systems has not been compromised. The mechanisms for
insuring that juries are competent and unbiased—voir dire, per-
emptory challenges, and challenges for cause—all work in those
jurisdictions without alienating a segment of the populations from
the mechanisms of civic participation. The citizens of New York
deserve no less.
428 N.Y. JUD. LAW § 510(3) (McKinney 2003); supra note 3 and accompanying text.

